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CONSIDERING TORTIOUS RACISM
Camille A. Nelson*
My own view is that we did brilliantly up until about the
[19]60s and then we lost it. I think the pain of racism
really hasn 't been fully articulated yet. We talk about
various changes and all of that, but we've
underestimated the psychological damage American
slavery and its legacy has wrought upon the lives of
Blacks in general.'
INTRODUCTION
The recent concurrence of Justice Ginsburg in Grutter v. Bollinger,
2
and her dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger,3 cogently explore what W.E.
DuBois termed problems of the "color line".4  The ongoing
consequences of racism 5 in America reveal a complicated racial caste
* Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; LL.B. University of
Ottawa, Canada, LL.M Columbia Law School. I wish to thank Dean Jeffrey Lewis
and the faculty of Saint Louis University School of Law for their support. As my
thoughts developed I was particularly grateful to the organizers and participants of the
Congress of Law and Mental Health, Montreal 2001, and to the scholars and activists
who attended the Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference 2002
hosted by DePaul College of Law and Loyola College of Law for providing valuable
feedback. Thanks also to the Law, Cultures, and the Philosophy of 'Science', Mid-
Atlantic People of Color Conference, held at Washington and Lee University, School
of Law, University of Cincinnati, School of Law and Rutgers School of Law -
Camden for allowing me to present this paper as a work in progress. Also, a special
thanks to my research assistants, Ms. Robyn Hill, Mr. Piran Farhadieh and Mr. Eric
Tuncil for their diligence and hard work.
1 Interview by George Yancy with Laurence Thomas, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS: SEVENTEEN CONVERSATIONS 298 (George Yancy ed., 1998) (cited in
JOE R. FEAGIN & KARYN D. MCKINNEY, THE MANY COSTS OF RACISM 42 (2003)).
2 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4 See W.E.B. DuBouis, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS 13 (Dover Publications 1994).
5 See David Williams et al., Racial Differences in Physical and Mental Health, 2 AM.
J. HEALTH PSYCH. 335, 336 (1997) ("racism includes an ideology of superiority that
categorizes and ranks various groups, negative attitudes and beliefs about outgroups
and differential treatment of outgroups by individuals and societal institutions."). See
generally Joe R. Feagin, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES AND FUTURE
REPARATIONS (2000) (exploring many manifestations of racism including systemic
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system, the medico-legal consequences of which merit exploration.
6
Following in the footsteps of other great jurists, Justice Ginsburg
situates the challenges facing persons of color in the context of
American history and connects the racialized dots to recognize the
ongoing effects of racism. 7 Together with the majority opinion in
8Grutter, Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that race still matters in
America. Segregation persists, both educational and residential.
Further, indicia of socio-economic status (SES), together with
employment and health status, reveal continuing disparities along racial
lines.9 The reality of disparate physical and mental health care, which
racism, the legacy of slavery, racist ideology, racial imagery and racism in everyday
practices).
6 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM 1960S TO THE 1980S 12 (1986) (cited in Williams, supra note 5, at 336).
Anthropologists and health researchers emphasize that "race is a gross indicator of
distinctive social and individual histories and not a measure of biological
distinctiveness. Races are socially constructed categories that have emerged in the
context of social and economic oppression and have been used to perpetuate
economic, cultural, ideological, political and legal systems of inequity." Williams,
supra note 5, at 336. Race is a Concept "generated across a range of discourses and
used to distinguish and classify human beings." Camille A. Nelson, (En)Raged or
(En)Gages: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian Provocation Defense,
35 U. RICH. L. REv. 1007, 1010 n.23 (2002) (citing CAROLINE KNOWLES, RACE
DISCOURSE AND LABOURISM (1992). The concept of race generally has "some
phenotypical component such as skin color upon which social, cultural and
ysychological differences are constructed.
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("This insistence on
"consistency" would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank
discrimination long reinforced by law. ... But we are not far distant from an overtly
discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain
painfully evident in our communities and schools.").8See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (O'Connor, J., majority) ("[j]ust as growing up in a
particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an
individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority
in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.").
9See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 299 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
In the wake "of a system of racial caste only recently ended," large
disparities endure. Unemployment, poverty, and access to health
care vary disproportionately by race. Neighborhoods and schools
remain racially divided. African-American and Hispanic children
are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming
institutions. Adult African-Americans and Hispanics generally
earn less than whites with equivalent levels of education. Equally
credentialed job applicants receive different receptions depending
on their race. Irrational prejudice is still encountered in real estate
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contributes to disparate physical and mental health, is intricately
connected to SES and race.1° By highlighting several areas
disproportionately affected by racialization, Justice Ginsburg
recognizes the continuity of negative societal consequences derived
from conscious or unconscious racial bias.
This article will focus upon the mental health consequences of
the American racial caste system and consider how tort law might
address these disparities to achieve racial recompense. The disparities
created by societal constructions of race 1 will be conceptualized from
an impact-driven perspective. This perspective acknowledges that the
consequences of racial disparities, which are closely tied to disparities
in socio-economic status, F: are often abusive to those so victimized.
Recognition of the resultant negative mental health sequelae, which
flows from racial victimization, demands exploration of the remedial
compensation the law might provide to those abused by systemic and
individualized racism. In this way, the consequences of racial
discrimination are recognized as analogous to the consequences
flowing from other abusive contexts.
markets and consumer transactions. Bias both conscious and
unconscious reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of
thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal
opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become
this country's law and practice. Id.
10 See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A
NATION 3-31 (1999).
1 This view does not deny that there may be biological aspects to race. See supra
n.6. However, science has established that genetic and biological factors are not the
sole nor the central defining characteristics of race and are, accordingly, unlikely to
be the primary sources of racial differences in health. See generally Norman B.
Anderson et al., Autonomic Reactivity and hypertension in blacks: A review and
proposed model, 1 ETHNICITY & DISEASE 154 (1991); Maya McNeilly et al., The
Perceived Racism Scale: A Multidimensional Assessment Of The Experience Of White
Racism Among African Americans, 6 ETHNICITY & DISEASE 154 (1996) (cited in
Williams, supra note 5, at 336).
12 SHARMILA LAWRENCE ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY,
DEPRESSION, SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 10, available at
http://www.nccp.org/media/dsd04-text.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004); National
Center for Children in Poverty, Disasters and Domestic Violence,
www.ncptsd.org/facts/disasters/fs domestic.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004); JODY
RAPHAEL & RICHARD M. TOLMAN, TRAPPED BY POVERTY, TRAPPED BY ABUSE,
available at www.ssw.umich.edu/trapped/pubstrapped.pdf (last visited Sept. 28,
2004). See Lori Heise et al., Center for Health and Gender Equity, Ending Violence
Against Women (Population Reports, Series L, No. 11, 1999), available at
http://www.jhuccp.org/pr/Ill/111chap5_3.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
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Within the American system of racial apartheid, 13 a norm of
disparate impact is created at the intersection of race and class. The
exploration of issues related to the physical and psychological impact,
versus intentionality, of racialized abuses is mandated if one takes
seriously the goal of racial recompense and the (re)creation of equality
maximizing non-constitutional law doctrine. 14 Focus upon intent in the
absence of impact marginalizes a central component of any analysis o7
racism. As the legal tests15 have proven to be significant hurdles for the
racially marginalized to overcome, constitutional protections are not
always accessible. 16 Similarly, the great promise of civil rights laws has
been elusive. 17 Although originally created to address racial disparities
and racial abuses, civil rights doctrine has not proven to be the golden
vehicle for remedying racial wrongs. Moreover, the language of civil
rights has been co-opted and is often used by those who are
antagonistic to its founding principles and origins. Furthermore,
13 See generally PETIT APARTHEID IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE DARK
FIGURE OF RACISM (Dragan Milovanovic & Katheryn K. Russell eds., 2001).
14 Although racial differences are generally reduced with improved SES, they
frequently persist even after adjustment for income, class, and education. Moreover,
for some of the indicators of SES, racial differences increase and are worsened as
SES improves. Therefore, exclusive emphasis on differences in SES as solely
responsible for racial differences in health is inadequate and unfounded. See
Williams, supra note 5, at 337; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
15 U.S. CONST. amend IV (describing the discriminatory effect needed to determine
whether or not segregation was intended by certain municipalities).
16 See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (discussing the doctrine of
discriminatory purpose which was established in the 1976 decision of Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). This well establishing line of reasoning provides that
Title VI does not of its own force proscribe unintentional racial discrimination, no
matter its impact.
17 See generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); DERRICK
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (Basic
Books 1992); ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE AND
UNEQUAL (Ballantine Books 1992); JOE R. FEAGIN, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE
BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE (Beacon Press 1994); Herbert A. Eastman,
Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J.
763 (1995) (discussing the failure of civil rights pleadings to adequately portray,
through language, the reality of the abuses sought to be remedied); Emily Houh,
Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of
Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025 (2003).
18 See American Civil Rights Institute, http://www.acri.org; Center for Equal
Opportunity, http://www.ceousa.org.
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criminal law sanctions for hate crimes and hate speech are often
unwieldy and present their own challenges for effective utilization., 9
Therefore, it behooves those interested in achieving compensation for
racial abuses to consider all of the legal and non-legal options
available. This includes revisiting traditional, even archaic, legal
principles with equality-seeking norms in mind. Such a revolutionary
exploration of traditional doctrine entails working within the legal
system, utilizing every available doctrine for equality-seeking ends,
while simultaneously agitating for structural changes that make
utilization of such exclusive doctrine ultimately unnecessary.
With these normative goals in mind, this article will focus on
the potential of some tort law doctrines to be used as vehicles for
analysis of the impact of racial abuse. The intentional tort law
doctrines of assault, battery and infliction of nervous shock will be
considered together with the negligence law proximate cause doctrines
of the Thin-Skull plaintiff and Eggshell personality as capable of
providing legal remedies for mental and physical harms caused by
racial abuse. Revisiting these foundational tort doctrines conceptually
opens space for their consideration as legal theories capable of racial
contextualization. The later two substantive law doctrines are
interesting precisely because they allow for tort recovery when the
plaintiff is not "ordinary" in the common legal sense of the word. This
baseline consideration of "normalcy" will be explored from a racialized
perspective with reference to what shall be referred to as "critical
psychology" and "critical sociology. '20  Importantly, critical
psychology and critical sociology address the socio-political constructs
that impact mental, physical and spiritual health, thereby disparately
19 Legislation imposes significant limitations on full recovery, be that free speech
concerns, stringent intent requirements and disparate enforcement. See generally
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? (1997); JEANNINE
BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE CRIME
(2002); JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW &
IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights 1875-
1883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J. NEGRO HIST. 368, 373-75 (1969); Risa L. Goluboff,
The Thirteenth Amendment And The Lost Origins Of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609.
20 This critical interdisciplinary approach recognizes critical psychology and
sociology as those sub-categories of their disciplines that respond to the traditionally
assumed universality of experience by recognizing the subjectivity of experience,
especially as the psyche is impacted by societal factors including race, gender, sexual
orientation, class, culture, religion and the intersection of these realities.
20051
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
affecting those operating at the margins of society.2'
Part I of this article will explore a cogent example of racialized
abuse. Specifically, the cross-burning cases which were consolidated in
Virginia v. Black,22 a case decided by the United States Supreme Court
in the spring of 2003 will be considered in light of the critical
psychology and sociology. This case is interesting for a number of
reasons, not the least of which is the ignored mental and physical
effects of such racialized abuse on those so victimized. Part II uses the
facts fiom a St. Louis racial incident as a hypothetical framework for
exploration of tort law doctrine capable of achieving recompense for
racial abuse. In the likely event that the tortfeasor attempts to articulate
lack of intention in committing such racial abuse, the negligence law
proximate cause liability enhancers of the thin-skull plaintiff and the
egg-shell doctrine will be examined in Part III. This part will view the
recent articulation and settlement of an eggshell claim at the University
of Virginia, School of Law. The final part will analyze the potential
advantages and disadvantages of such racial contextualization as
political paradox. Critical psychology and sociology will be explored
throughout the article in order to assess how best to engage and inform
tort law with the normative goal of equality enhancement.
PART I: CROSS BURNING AS RACIALIZED ABUSE
'a page of history is worth a volume of logic 23
A. Virginia v. Black Through The Racially Distorted
Lens Of American History
The cases of O'Mara v. Commonwealth of Virginia and Elliott v.
Commonwealth of Virginia24 involve the non-consensual attempted
burning of a cross in the backyard of the home of James S. Jubilee, an
African-American man. The companion case of Black v.
21 See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back: A Consideration of
Mitigatory Criminal Defenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 77 (2003).
22 Virginia, 538 U.S. at 343.
23 Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 343.
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Commonwealth of Virginia involves a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rally on
private property with the permission of the owner, where a cross was
burned as part of the ceremony. Although the cross burned in Black
was within view of a public highway, (and thus might have affected
passersby) O'Mara will be focused upon in light of the method of
intimidation chosen by O'Mara and Elliott to harass their Black
neighbor.
Misters O'Mara and Elliott claim that they burned the cross on
the lawn of their neighbor, Mr. Jubilee, since they were angry that he
asked about their use of their back yard as a firing range. While
O'Mara and Elliott claim that theirs was not a cross burning based on
racism, but rather neighborly intimidation, their chosen method of
intimidation is insightful and reveals the historically steeped racial
hostility under which they labored. They knew their neighbor, Mr.
Jubilee, was Black and they also must be deemed to know the history
of their country - they certainly know of their right to bear firearms.
Instead of selecting one of the many race-neutral modes of
communication and intimidation,z5 they opted to bum a cross on the
private property of their Black neighbor. In all likelihood they did this
because they knew that cross burning in America has a certain
historical salience especially when deployed against people of color
and those deemed enemies by the KKK.26 If they did not actually know
this racialized history, they ought to have known - such a-historical
negligent racism should not provide a shield from impact driven racial
recompense.
The history of cross burning in America is largely a history of
racial abuse. While certainly not the only form of racial abuse deployed
against people of color,27 it is one of the more frequently recognized
25 They could, for instance, have constructed a placard advocating for gun usage, they
could have left a letter for Mr. Jubilee, they could have left a NRA brochure for their
neighbor, or they could simply have told him to mind his own business and that they
would use their backyard as a firing range if they so desired.
26 Enemies of the KKK include Blacks, Jews, Latinos, Gays, Lesbians, Transsexuals,
Catholics, Muslims, and anyone who is not Christian or committed to Christian
values. See Knights of the Klu Klux Klan Party, http://www.kkk.bz (last visited Jan.
9, 2006).
27 See generally JAMES ALLEN ET AL., WITHOUT SANCTUARY LYNCHING (Twin Palms
Publishing 2000); JAMES H. MADISON, A LYNCHING IN THE HEARTLAND: RACE AND
MEMORY IN AMERICA; Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for
Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181 (2004); Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk:
Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81
(2004); ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND : THE TULSA RIOT
OF 1921: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION (2002).
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forms of terrorism by Americans against fellow Americans. Burning a
cross is an intentional act meant to convey a historically informed
message. Cross burnings do not happen by spontaneous combustion,
but rather are premeditated events often meant to intimidate and
threaten the victim(s) with violence.28 The design of cross burnings is
the orchestration of fear. The Supreme Court recognized that those who
would bum a cross intend that the recipients of the message fear for
their lives. 29 Few, if any, messages of intimidation are more powerful.
The very aim of a cross burning is the physical and mental impact
which is actually achieved. To deny the reality of these intentions is
absurd and smacks of willful blindness.
As the case of Elliott and O'Mara reveal, even individuals
without Klan affiliation who wish to threaten or menace a racialized
person will resort to cross burning, rather than racially benign threats,
due to the association between a burning cross, violence and racialized
abuse. Moreover, the history of violence associated with the Klan, and
other White supremacist groups, shows that the possibility of injury or
death is real - the depth of this history of racialized abuse is revealed
by the number of reported incidents in which the victim of a cross
burning later felt the wrath of the Klan.3°
Thus, our shared history of racial and ethnic hostilities
transforms otherwise innocuous symbols or words into powerful forms
of abuse - racialized meaning is breathed into words and symbols by
virtue of historical and contemporary fact. For instance, it would be
complete abstraction to claim a neutral meaning for a swastika.31 Such
a position would be untenable in contemporary German or American
28 Virginia, 538 U.S. at 391 (Thomas, C., dissenting) ( "[B]ecause the modem Klan
expanded the list of its enemies beyond blacks and "radical[s]," to include Catholics,
Jews, most immigrants, and labor unions, ... a burning cross is now widely viewed as
a signal of impending terror and lawlessness.").
2 9 id.
30 See generally Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment:
White Neighbors' Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335
(2002); JAMES W. CLARKE, THE LINEAMENTS OF WRATH: RACE, VIOLENT CRIME, AND
AMERICAN CULTURE (Transaction Publishers 1998); FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE,
LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (University of
Illinois Press 1993); STEWART TOLNAY, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHNGS, 1882-1930 (University of Illinois Press 1995).
31 Psychological Effects of the Holocaust,
http://www.studyworld.com/basementpapers/repce/History/80.htm (last visited Sept.
28, 2004); Patty Alvarez, The Nature of Hate Crimes: A Literature View, 69
BULLETIN 26 (2001), available at http://www.stophate.org/stophate/STH
Program/STH files/litreviewalvarez.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
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society, despite the origins of the swastika as a symbol of peace and
32harmony. The depiction of a swastika is thus an image which is now
so tainted, by virtue of history and the ongoing legacy of the Nazi
party, as to be almost universally recognized as an image of pure
hatred. The swastika is a toxic symbol, sure to arose intense anxiety in
many persons, but likely particularly powerful and painful for Jewish
persons subjected to its depiction.
Similarly, for many Black people, and African Americans in
particular, a cross burning is a powerful signifier of hatred, racial
violence and white supremacy which is now unmoored from its
Scottish ancestry.33 Part of the power of the American racial caste
system, which O'Mara and Elliott drew upon, is the ability of symbols
or words to invoke the nightmarish history of violent racial oppression
and its legacy of hostility in a heartbeat. Indeed, the decision of the
majority of the United States Supreme Court recognized cross burning
as inextricably intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan and
directed violence. 4
In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, the Supreme Court
found an ordinance violate of the First Amendment. The relevant
ordinance made it a misdemeanor for persons to place, on public or
private property, symbols, objects, appellations, characterizations or
graffiti which they knew, or reasonable should have known, would
invoke anger, alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.35 In contrast, the Court held in Virginia v. Black
32 The History of the Swastika,
http://historyl900s.about.com/cs/swastika/a/swastikahistory.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2004).
33 Cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and
messages of shared ideology. The Supreme Court noted that first initiation ceremony
occurred on Stone Mountain near Atlanta, Georgia. While a 40-foot cross burned on
the mountain, the Klan members took their oaths of loyalty. Virginia, 538 U.S. at 354
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("For example, in 1939 and 1940, the Klan burned crosses in
front of synagogues and churches... After one cross burning at a synagogue, a Klan
member noted that if the cross burning did not "shut the Jews up, we'll cut a few
throats and see what happens."").
34 Id.
3' R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 380, 396 (1992). In finding the
statute facially unconstitutional, the Court states:
Although the phrase in the ordinance, "arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others," has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme
Court's construction to reach only those symbols or displays that
amount to "fighting words," the remaining, unmodified terms make
clear that the ordinance applies only to "fighting words" that insult, or
2005]
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that Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment
insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate. The majority
determined that unlike the statute at issue in R. A. V., the Virginia
statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed
toward "one of the specified disfavored topics. ' 36 Specifically, under
the disputed Virginia statute it does not matter whether an individual
burns a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim's race,
gender, or religion, or because of the victim's political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality. 37 Rather a generalized ban on cross
burning carried out with the intent to intimidate was held fully
consistent with the Court's holding in R. A. V and is, therefore,
permissible under the First Amendment.38 While I applaud the ultimate
provoke violence, "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender." Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious
or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the
specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use "fighting words" in
connection with other ideas--to express hostility, for example, on the
basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality--are
not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects. Id. at 391.
36 Virginia, 538 U.S. at 345.
Moreover, as a factual matter it is not true that cross burners direct their
intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities. See, e.g.,
supra, at 8 (noting the instances of cross burnings directed at union
members); State v. Miller, 6 Kan. App. 2d 432, 629 P. 2d 748 (1981)
(describing the case of a defendant who burned a cross in the yard of
the lawyer who had previously represented him and who was currently
prosecuting him). Indeed, in the case of Elliott and O'Mara, it is at least
unclear whether the respondents burned a cross due to racial animus.
See 262 Va., at 791, 553 S. E. 2d, at 753 (Hassell, J., dissenting)
(noting that "these defendants burned a cross because they were angry
that their neighbor had complained about the presence of a firearm
shooting range in the Elliott's yard, not because of any racial animus").
Virginia, 538 U.S. at 362
37 Id.
38 Id. at 344.
The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done
with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly
virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating
messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating
[VOL.9.2:905
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outcome of this decision, the ruling is a-historical and de-
contextualized due to over-zealous application of abstracted
colorblindness. Justice Thomas, in dissent, spoke of this abstraction
when he commented upon the historical significance of the sacred and
profane. In his opinion, the unique position of the American flag was a
quintessential example of the sacred, while cross burning is a
paradigmatic illustration of the profane.39
While rightfully acknowledging that "the person who burns a
cross directed at a particular person often is making a serious threat,
meant to coerce the victim to comply with the Klan's wishes unless the
victim is willing to risk the wrath of the Klan," the majority of the
Court ignores the historical and contemporary reality of the racialized
identity of the enemies of the KKK - particularly persons of color. This
is remarkable given the origin, history and continued activities of White
Supremacist groups and their involvement in domestic terrorism.
40
White supremacy has deep roots in America - most Americans,
African-Americans in particular, are aware of the randomized violence
historically unleashed by White Supremacists for more than a
41century. Such violence is not merely a historical fixity or an
aberration. Indeed, white supremacist groups, which should properly be
deemed terrorist organizations, continue to operate throughout the
United States. 42 Recent examples of their racial violence include the
Jasper, Texas lynching and the copycat acts of racial violence
perpetrated against Black men in Belleville, Illinois and Slidell,
Louisiana. 4
The majority recognizes the potency of cross burning as an
effective form of racialized abuse, even when used by those without
Klan affiliation. They state, "as the cases of respondents Elliott and
messages in light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a
signal of impending violence. Thus, just as a State may regulate only
that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so
too may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that
are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm. Id.
39 Id. at 388.40 See JAMES ALLEN ET AL., WITHOUT SANCTUARY LYNCHING (Twin Palms
Publishing 2000); The Murder of James Byrd Jr.,
http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/Junl998/byrd-j 13.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2004);
The Oklahoma City Bombing,
http://www.indystar.com/library/factfiles/crime/national/1995/oklahoma-city-bombin
g/ok.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
41 FEAG1N & McKiNNEY, supra note 1, at 49.
42 Id. at 49.
43 id.
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O'Mara indicate, individuals without Klan affiliation who wish to
threaten or menace another person sometimes use cross burning
because of this association between a burning cross and violence.
'
"
4
The non-affiliation of Elliott and O'Mara with the KKK does not
render the cross burning benign. Such racism is malignant and has both
profound physiological and psychic consequences for those victimized
- the intentions or group membership of the abuser(s) is irrelevant for
purposes of gauging the harm experienced. For instance, critical
psychology has demonstrated that Blacks exposed to racist imagery
experience significant changes in galvanic skin response and heart rate
acceleration upon observation of the abuses.45 To expect the Jubilee
family to peer out of their window and ascertain the niceties of the
cross burner's affiliation or non-affiliation with White supremacists is
to expect the ridiculous. At the moment of an intimidating cross
burning few Blacks in America will care whether or not the cross-
burners are KKK members, KKK supporters or even KKK detractors.
The import, threat and impact is the same regardless of affiliation -
racial violence and abuse. Accordingly, the impact must be the starting
point - unintentional racism does not hurt less. The consequences of
racial abuses persist even in the absence of intention.
Similarly, Justice Thomas highlights the salience of America's
history of racial violence. He stated that, while a White Protestant man
would likely be alarmed to find a cross burning on his lawn in the
middle of the night he would likely call the fire department, however a
Black family finding the same thing would be wise to call the police.46
History has taught Blacks in America that those who would burn
crosses in their yards mean to send a particular type of message that
inflicts a particular type of harm. In the lexicon of racialized imagery,
cross burning, together with lynching imagery and images of police
brutality invoke a particular kind of vulnerability47 for Blacks in
44 Virginia, 532 U.S. at 357.
45 Linda Myers et al., Physiological Responses to Anxiety and Stress: Reactions to
Oppression, Galvanic Skin Potential, and Heart Rate, 20 JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES
80, 90 (1989).
46 Virginia, 538 U.S. at 388.
47 See generally ANXIETY DISORDERS IN AFRICAN AMERICANS (Steven Friedman ed.,
1994); Mikhailin Karina, Treating Anxiety Disorder in African Americans, AM.
WKLY., Oct. 20, 1998, at 2, available at
http://veracity.univpubs.american.edu/weekly-site/weeklypast/102098/story_3.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
African Americans with an anxiety disorder often experience
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America. 48 One cannot witness such racial hostility as a Black person
without having one's insides turned out. "Connections between hostile
epithets and acts in the distant or recent past and those in the present
are central aspects of individual and collective memories in [B]lack
communities., 49 In this vein, Justice Thomas recollected the effects of a
cross burning in another fairly recent case.
After the mother saw the burning cross, she was crying on
her knees in the living room. [She] felt feelings of
frustration and intimidation and feared for her husband's
life. She testified what the burning cross symbolized to her
as a black American: 'murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just
about anything bad that you can name. It is the worst thing
that can happen to a person.' Mr. Heisser told the probation
officer that at the time of the occurrence, if the family did
not leave, he believed someone would return to commit
murder.... Seven months after the incident, the family still
lived in fear. . . . This is a reaction reasonably to be
anticipated from this criminal conduct." United States v.
physiological symptoms that are not experienced as often or at all in
white Americans. He cites a 1994 study by Horwith, Johnson, and
Hornig, in which 55 percent of African Americans surveyed reported
strong tingling and numbness in extremities at times when they become
very anxious, while only 29 percent of white Americans surveyed had
these sensations. Also, 77 percent of African Americans, versus 58
percent of white Americans, experienced hot and cold flashes; and 61
percent of African Americans, but only 46 percent of white Americans,
felt tightness and pain in the chest.
Similarly, in a 1986 study by Bell, 36 percent of African Americans-
and no white Americans-reported experiencing "isolated sleep
paralysis, when the person is either asleep or waking up, when they
find themselves to be essentially paralyzed," says Carter. "So,
consciously you are awake and alert to what is going on in your
surroundings, but you can't actually do anything. You feel thoroughly
trapped in that particular situation and it brings on quite a bit of
anxiety." Karina, supra, at 2.
48Andy Humm, Reactions to Police Killings of Unarmed Black New Yorkers,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 2, 2003),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/20030602/3/409 (last visited Sept. 28, 2004);
CNN.com, Probe Under Way into Death of New York Man, Fired Upon 41 Times by
Police, http://www.cnn.com/IUS/9902/05/police.shooting (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
49 FEAG1N & McKINNEY, supra note 1, at 49-50.
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Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1378 (CA9 1991) (emphasis
added).50 (Emphasis in original)
Accordingly, there are symbols, icons and imagery so profound
in their implication as to trigger powerful physical and mental reactions
in the victim of racist abuse. 5 1  Interestingly, in assessing, and
ultimately allowing, greater punishment for hate crimes in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell,52 Chief Justice Rehnquist accepted the theory of greater
punishment for greater harms. Writing for the majority, the Chief
Justice accepted that bias-inspired conduct "is thought to inflict greater
individual than societal harm." 53 Indeed, the court noted that, "bias-
motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict
emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest." 54
Accordingly, in upholding the Wisconsin statute, the court determined
that "the State's desire to redress these perceived harms provides an
adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provisions over and
above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs and biases.,
55
It is not, therefore, inconsistent with existing Supreme Court
recognition of the impact of racialized abuses to acknowledge the
legitimacy of the critical psychology and sociology. Accordingly, in the
face of claims denying racist intentions, a cross burning is a catalyst so
intense as to generate extreme physical and mental reactions, not the
least of which include anger, fear, panic,56 sorrow, humiliation,
50 Virginia, 538 U.S. at 390.
51 Racism and Power in the South,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/25/nationallmain330498.shtm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2004); Lawsuit Against the Southern Company,
http://www.dogonvillage.com/petition/lawsuit.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
52 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993).
5 3Id
54 Id. at 488.
55 id.
56 Ewald Horwath et al., Epidemiology Of Panic Disorder, in ANXIETY DISORDERS IN
AFRICAN AMERICANS 62-63 (Steven Friedman eds., 1994).
... this study found that panic disorder is a similar illness among
African Americans and whites in terms of prevalence, symptoms and
other clinical features. It is a disorder associated with substantial
comorbidity and risk for suicide attempts. Most African Americans
with panic disorder never reach appropriate treatment. Other studies
have suggested that those who do get treatment are likely to be
misdiagnosed and have a poor treatment outcome. With the exception
that African Americans are more likely to report tingling of extremities
and a higher mean number of symptoms during their worst episode, the
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desperation, devastation and the corresponding physiological responses
which include increased heart rate, galvanic skin response and elevated
blood pressure.57 Increasingly, sociologists and psychologists are
studying the impact of racism. This growing body of social science
research is informative for lawyers and activists seeking to encourage
the recognition of impact-driven assessments of racism and other forms
of discrimination.
B. Racial Hostility and Psycho-Social Stress
The debilitating effects of racism stem not only from obviously
racialized abuses, but also from specific social situations and lifetime
experiences of racialized hostility. These discriminatory experiences
are not isolated, but accumulate over the course of one's life, in
workplaces, schools, businesses and other randomized locations. As
events, they often include driving, walking, shopping, studying or
standing while Black or Brown. Like the death of a family member,
racialized encounters can become crises, which in turn have serious
health consequences. 58 It should not be surprising, therefore, that both
physical and mental health are negatively impacted by racist
encounters.59 It has been noted by psychologists that "fearful and
racially noxious images" produced elevated heart rates in Blacks.6 °
Further, it should not be surprising that exposure to racist stimuli
clinical features of panic disorder do not appear to differ significantly
between African Americans and whites.
Despite the clinical similarity of this disorder in African Americans and
whites, there is reason to believe that panic disorder is not adequately
recognized and treated among African Americans. The evidence for
misdiagnosis and poor treatment outcomes among African Americans
indicates the need for improved diagnosis and treatment of panic
disorder in this population. Id.
57 See recent study finding that racial discrimination not only is associated with
systolic and diastolic blood pressure but accounts for a part of the association between
race and blood pressure. Nancy Krieger & Stephen Sidney, Racial Discrimination
and blood pressure: the CARDIA study of young black and white women and men, 86
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1370-1378 (1996) (cited in Williams, supra note 5, at 338).
58 See LYDIA RAPPOPORT, The State of Crisis: Some Theoretical Considerations, in
CRISIS INTERVENTION: SELECTED READINGS 22-31 (Howard J. Parad ed., 1965).
ROBERT A. KARASEK & TORES THEORELL, HEALTHY WORK 71 (1990) (cited in
FEAGIN & McKINNEY, supra note 1, at 54).
59 FEAGIN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 54.
60 Vetta L. Sanders Thompson, Perceived Experiences of Racism as Stressful Life
Events, 32 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 224 (1996).
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results in increased blood pressure6 1 or that prejudiced treatment based
on race resulted in self-reporting of hypertension. 62 Anderson, using the
experience of racism as a stressor, demonstrated the physiological
(increased cardiovascular reactivity) and psychological (anger)
reactivity of African Americans to racism. 63
While the majority opinion in Black adequately recognizes the
pernicious use of cross burning as a signal of impending violence, the
decision fails to recognize cross burning as violence in itself. Further,
the decision fails to recognize the particularly abusive consequences of
impending violence as it has been historically deployed against those
racially marginalized in American society. "Stressful life events have
been characterized as those situations that are tension producing and
could adversely affect an individual's mental health... [while] distress
is considered a subjective state that occurs when the individual is
unable to cope effectively with the stressor."64 Being victimized by a
cross burning is indeed a stressful life event.
Short of a lynching or being the victim of non-lethal physical
violence, there are few other images so capable of inflicting horror in
the minds of a racialized person. The psychological sequelae of
racialized abuses is completely ignored by the majority, as are the
many other instances of racial hostility with which Blacks in America
are all too familiar. Instances of racialized abuse leave long-lasting
mental scars, which are seldom recognized by the legal system.
[O]ne African American psychologist once explained [...]
that, when he hears the epithet "nigger," in the back of his
mind he sees a [B]lack man hanging from a tree. This is not
surprising, because he grew up in the segregation era when
lynchings of [B]lack men were much more common than
they are today. In this way, past experience informs and
contextualizes present events. Indeed, the impact of racist
epithets is often underestimated by outside, especially
61 Sanders Thompson, supra note 60, at 224 (citing C. Armstead et al., Relationship of
Racial Stressors to Blood pressure Responses and Anger Expression in Black College
Students, 8 HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 541, 541-56 (1989)).
62 Sanders Thompson, supra note 60, at 224 (citing Nancy Krieger, Racial and
Gender Discrimination: Risk Factors for High Blood Pressure?, 30 Soc. SCI. MED.
1273, 1273-81 (1990)).
63 id.
64 Sanders Thompson, supra note 60, at 224 (citing Judith G. Rabkin & Elmer L.
Struening, Life Events, Stress, and Illness, 194 SCIENCE 1013, 1013-1020 (1976)).
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[W]hite, observers. 65
Such pain and distress are typically manifested in one of two
ways - either as "depression, demoralization and hopelessness" or as
"anxiety, fear and worry., 66 In turn, these psychological reactions spiral
to create effects on physical health. Recognizing this disparate vicious
cycle, it has been suggested that experiences of racial discrimination
are causally linked to health problems and are associated with higher
incidence of disability and psychological distress as well as with
decreased levels of life satisfaction and well-being.
67
As one noted therapist has commented, "[n]ot only do our
African American clients encounter racism on a daily basis, but their
lives seem to contain more major stress and minor hassles than the lives
of our white clients., 68 Specifically, racism has been found to
contribute significantly to psychiatric symptoms among Blacks.69
Racist discrimination contributes uniquely to somatization, obsessive-
compulsive scales, interpersonal sensitivity, depression and anxiety
beyond the contribution of generic and status stressors. 70 The cyclical
nature of racism bears noting. One longitudinal research study revealed
that "African-Americans who reported racial discrimination at one
point in time were more likely to report high levels of psychological
distress in a subsequent interview., 71 Further, the impact of racial
discrimination has temporal aspects since it has stressful sequelae over
65 FEAGIN & McK1NNEY, supra note 1, at 48.
66 FEAGIN & MCKpNNEY, supra note 1, at 54 (citing JOHN MIROWSKY & CATHERINE
E. Ross, SOCIAL CAUSES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS (2003))
67 Id. (citing DAVID R. WILLIAMS & AN-ME CHUNG, Racism and Health, in HEALTH
IN BLACK AMERICA (Rose C. Gibson & James S. Jackson eds., 1995)).
68 WILLIAMS & CHAMBLESS, supra note 68, at 159.
69 Elizabeth A. Klonoff et al., Racial Discrimination and Psychiatric Symptoms
Among Blacks, 5 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 329, 333
(1999).
70 Klonoff, supra note 69, at 333 tbl. 2 ("[i]rrespective of the type of analysis
conducted, racist discrimination emerged as a powerful predictor of Blacks'
psychiatric symptoms. In the stepwise regressions, racist discrimination was the best
predictor of half of the symptoms measured and was a more powerful predictor of
those symptoms than generic stressors and social status. In the hierarchical
regressions, racist discrimination contributed significantly to symptoms above and
beyond the contribution of contextual factors such as age, gender, education, social
class and generic stressors.")
" FEAGIN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 42.
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time. 72
Thus the majority opinion in Black considers cross burning in a
vacuum - a whitewashed vacuum which is unyielding in its refusal to
acknowledge the impact of racial abuses. Recent studies of people of
color in the United States have found that the experience of
discrimination is linked to higher levels of stress and psychological
suffering, including depression and lower levels of life satisfaction. 73
Ignorance of such an impact results in judicial racial abstraction. This,
in turn, produces a legally (e)raced history devoid of the particular
effects of racism as targeted and effective abuse. To be sure, such
racialized abuse would have particular effects on Mr. Jubilee, a Black
man, as the intended victim of harassment.
Typically the KKK does not burn crosses on the homes of
White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, unless they associate with other
enemies of the KKK i.e. "Niggerlovers." 74 Blacks in America have the
experience to know that such events are not isolated, "but rather form a
continuum of racist events, - ranging from nonviolent to extremely
violent - that characterize the everyday lives of most African
Americans. ' 75 The experience of such racism produces measurable
symptoms of subjective distress. Indeed, the presence of intrusion
72 See generally Vicki M. Mays et al., Perceived Race-Based Discrimination,
Employment Status, and Job Stress in a National Sample of Black Women:
Implications for Health Outcomes, 1 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCH. 319 (1996);
CHARLES B. WILKINSON & JEANNE SPURLOCK, Mental Health of Black Americans:
Psychiatric Diagnosis and Treatment, in ETHNIC PSYCHIATRY 13-50 (Charles B.
Wilkinson ed., 1986); Jewelle Taylor Gibbs & Diana Fuery, Mental Health and Well-
Being of Black Women: Toward Strategies of Empowerment, 22 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCH. 559 (1994); Ezra E. H. Griffith & F.M. Baker, Psychiatric Care of African
Americans, in CULTURE, ETHNICITY, AND MENTAL ILLNESS 147-173 (Albert C. Gaw
ed., 1993); Tony R. Brown et al., Being Black and Feeling Blue: The Mental Health
Consequences of Racial Discrimination, 2 RACE & SOCIETY 117 (2000) (cited in
FEAGIN & McKINNEY, supra note 1, at 42).
73 See generally Hortensia Amara et al., Family and Work Predictors of Psychological
Well-Being among Hispanic women Professionals, 11 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 505 (1987);
V. Nelly Salgado de Snyder, Factors Associated with Acculturative Stress and
Depressive Symptomology among Married Mexican Immigrant Women, 11 PSYCH.
WOMEN Q. 475 (1987); SARA E. GUTIERRES ET AL., Job Stress and Health Outcomes
among White and Hispanic Employees, in JOB STRESS IN A CHANGING WORKFORCE:
INVESTIGATING GENDER, DIVERSITY, AND FAMILY ISSUES 107-125 (Gwendolyn
Puryear Keita & Joseph J. Hurrell eds., 1994).
74 See Storm front White Nationalist Community,
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?t=- 151205 (last visited September
23, 2004).
75 FEAGN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 49.
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(characterized by unbidden thoughts and images, troubled dreams,
strong pangs or waves of feelings and repetitive behavior), or
avoidance (characterized by ideation constriction, denial of the
meaning and consequences of events, blunted sensation, behavioral
inhibition and awareness of emotional numbness) suggests a
psychological response similar to post-traumatic stress disorder.
76
Victims of trauma, regardless of degree, appear to experience stress
reactions similarly. While people undoubtedly experience and process
trauma differently, the crucial point is that the same elements persist
across various types of traumatic experiences, be that sexual assault,
death or stigmatization. Interestingly, some researchers have
determined that it can be even more difficult to cope with emotional
and psychological wounds than with physical or material deficiencies.78
Further, given the typical randomized nature of racial hostility,
such abuse has a trickle down, or trickle-around effect, as others in
racialized communities absorb some of this stress. Given the continuing
reality of hostility towards Blacks in America, it is not surprising that
many violent attacks motivated by racism are reported each year. 79 The
images of the worst of the attacks, instances of police brutality for
instance, are repeatedly communicated in the mass media and the
internet with significant mental sequelae for those similarly situated
who realize the randomness of such abuse.8 0 As such, it is not just the
individual racial attacks that a Black person must face and process.
Rather, family and community similarly internalize and process these
racialized incidents collectively in group memory and collective
consciousness. 81 Accordingly, memories of racism are formative on
many levels, not the least of which is the impact upon the development
of basic human sentiments, but also upon coping and survival strategies
76 Vetta L. Sanders, Perceived Experiences of Racism as Stressful Life Events, 32
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 231 (1996). See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.81, at 425-28 (4th ed. 2000).
77 See Laura Leets, Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-
Semetic andAntigay Speech, 58 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 341, 343 (2002).
78 Id. at 344 (citing Laura Leets & Howard Giles, Words As Weapons: When Do They
Wound? Investigations of Racist Speech, 24 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 260
(1997)).
79 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002
188 (122nd ed. 2002); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2003, at 206 (123rd ed. 2003); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005 193 (124th ed. 2004-2005).
80 FEAGIN & MCKiNNEY, supra note 1, at 42, 48-49.
81 Id.
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of the individual and the community. 82
C. Racial Hostility and Physiological Disparities
Critical psychology demonstrates that individuals who perceive the
experience of racism experience measurable psychological distress.
83
While those looking at such experiences in the criminal law setting tend
to focus on the experience of anger flowing from racism, there are other
equally relevant emotions such as hurt, pain and anxiety which the
victim of racism experiences. 84 In addition to discrimination at the
82 Id.
83 Vetta L. Sanders, Perceived Experiences of Racism as Stressful Life Events, 32
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 223, 232 (citing Williams, supra note 5, at 341).
Blacks are more likely than Whites to report major experiences of
discrimination in employment and in contact with the police. Only
slightly more Blacks than Whites (29% v.25%) report one
discriminatory event, but Blacks are twice as likely to report two
discriminatory experiences and seven times more likely to report three
experiences. Blacks also have significantly higher scores on the chronic
ongoing indicators of everyday discrimination, although the magnitude
of the racial gap is not as large as for the major experiences of
discrimination. There is a significant racial difference on chronic stress,
with Whites having higher levels of chronic stress than Blacks. Levels
of financial stress are significantly higher for Blacks than for Whites
and the average score on the life-events scale for Blacks is almost twice
that of Whites.
84 Indeed, this matter is all the more significant for those already suffering from
diagnosable mental illness. For instance racialized persons afflicted with agoraphobia
face increased prospects of panic attacks from encountering racism during exposure
sessions. The manner in which discrimination can interfere with the process of
treatment is revealing by the excerpt below. It is a reconstructed dialogue between a
white behavior therapist and her African-American Patient regarding exposure
treatment.
(As client and therapist approach a shopping mall)
Client: "I really don't want to do this today."
Therapist: (thinking anticipatory anxiety was the issue) "I know you are
anxious about going in there, but think of it as a chance to confront and
overcome the fear."
Client: "No, you don't understand. I don't have any money with me. I
can't buy anything."
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societal level, stressful life experiences linked to racialization also
adversely impact the health of communities of color in at least two
ways. First, stress is not randomly distributed in the population. It is
linked to social structure, status and roles determined both by the
quality and quantity of stress to which an individual is exposed. 85 The
structural location of Blacks in society, as intersected by SES, leads
Blacks in America to have higher levels of stress than Whites. Second,
the experience of specific incidents of racial bias can generate psychic
distress and lead to alterations in physiological processes that can
adversely affect health.86
While the example of a cross burning provides an extreme
instance of racial/ethnic/religious hatred, many, if not most, instances
of racial abuse are neither quite so obvious nor dramatic in their
invective. Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of such micro or macro-
aggressions takes its toll upon racialized victims.87 Noted critical
sociologist Prof Feagin, has found that "...accumulated experiences
Therapist: "That's OK. You can window shop. A lot of people do that.
For some people, it's a cheap way to have a good time."
Client: "That's OK for you. White people can go into a store and just
browse. But if a black person does it, the store security people will
watch her like a hawk. If I don't act like I'm really buying something,
they'll think I'm stealing."
WILLIAMS & CHAMBLESS, supra note 68, at 159. Accordingly, issues linked to
prejudice may interfere with treatment outcomes. The frequent incidence of racism
experiences by persons of color make it more difficult to treat persons suffering from
mental illnesses when their illness itself is aggravated by encounters of racism.
85 Williams, supra note 5, at 338.
86 Id.
87 See Helen Epstein, Ghetto Miasma; Enough to Make You Sick?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2003, at 77. See also B.S. McEwen & E. Stellar, Stress and the Individual:
Mechanisms Leading to Disease, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2093 (1993).
McEwen and Stellar coined the term "allostasis" to refer to the normal fluctuations of
certain body systems that maintain stability and "provide protection to the body by
responding to internal and external stress." According to McEwen, allostatic load is
increased under four conditions: (a) frequent stress exposure, which promotes
frequent exposure to stress hormones; (b) inadequate habituation to stressful
experiences, which also results in prolonged exposure to stress hormones; (c) inability
to recover, in which physiological arousal and reactivity continue even after the
stressor has been removed or terminated; and (d) system fatigue or dysfunction,
which triggers pathological compensatory responses in other systems. Camille A.
Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back: A Consideration of Mitgatory Criminal Defenses
and Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 77, 86 n.34 (2003) (citing Bruce S.
McEwen, Protective and Damaging Effects of Stress Mediators, 338 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 172, 172-75 (1998)).
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with White racist practices often reaches into thousands of minor and
major incidents by the time a Black American reaches her sixties or
seventies." 88  For Blacks in America, spending significant time in
predominantly White settings may be a (mental) health hazard as it has
been reported that such cross-racial exposure produces over a hundred
racist encounters annually. 89
Blacks working in, or traversing, historically white places
commonly report pain, anguish, anger, and rage. These
reactions may be immediately expressed in their words, the
tone of their comments, the character of their facial
expressions or they may be internalized in some fashion.
[All of the focus group respondents in Professor Feagin's
The Many Costs of Racism] indicated that they suffer
substantial recurring stress and frustration in racially hostile
workplaces or other societal settings. As one Midwestern
respondent stated, she knows her stress is linked to the
workplace because her symptoms do not happen "on
weekends or after five o'clock."90
Furthermore, for many people of color in America, past and
present discrimination as well as responses to that oppression are often
inscribed in collective memory. Not surprisingly, communities pass
along information from one generation to the next about discrimination,
coping strategies and the anger and disenchantment caused thereby. 91 It
is, therefore, reasonable that membership in the Black race has been
described by critical psychologists as entailing "exposure to highly
stressful experiences, triggered essentially by the fact of race."'92 Stress
and anxiety are defined in relation to one's ability to copy with one's
environment - these concepts address the reaction of an individual in
circumstances where their coping resources do not meet the demands of
88 FEAGIN & MCKNNEY, supra note 1, at 53.
89 Such discriminatory events can have a major impact on the way one looks at the
world. The accounts explored in The Many Costs of Racism explore unexpected or
severe White-generated discrimination. FEAGIN & MCK1NNEY, supra note 1, at 53.
90 FEAGIN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 44.
9' Id. at 53.
92 Linda James Myers et al., Physiological Responses to Anxiety and Stress: Reactions
to Oppression, Galvanic Skin Potential, and Heart Rate, 20 J. BLACK STUDIES 80, 80
(1989) (citing HECTOR MYERS, Holistic Definition and Measurements of States of
Non-Health, in AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: ASSUMPTIONS AND PARADIGMS FOR
RESEARCH ON BLACK PERSONS (Lewis M. King et al. eds., 1976)).
[VOL.9.2:905
CONSIDERING TOR TIOUS RACISM
the context. 93 "Coping strategies, in turn, are mediated by past
experiences, previctimization, psychological and physical strength,
status, needs, goals etc." 94 Stress, however, is not simply an unfortunate
fact of life as its impacts extend beyond the realm of the psyche.
Indeed, the sequelae of stress flow from the psyche into the physical
and the physiological thereby becoming a potential disease component.
It is increasingly being recognized that socially induced stress
is a factor which leads to chronic diseases, not just those diseases
designated as "psychosomatic".95 As Dodge and Martin have expressed
it, "the diseases of our times namely the chronic diseases, are
etiologically linked with excessive stress and in turn this stress is a
product of specific socially structured situations inherent in the
organization of modern technological societies." 96 While it was
previously thought that only exposure to sources of infection lead to
diseases, we now know that environmental conditions, including
socially constructed situations, create physiological stress - this in turn
contributes to our susceptibility to microbial infections.
97
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence that stressful life
events commonly precede the onset of a wide variety of physical and
psychiatric disorders in populations.98 Racism is, therefore, not merely
stressful, it is harmful psychologically, physiologically and physically.
Like anyone else, Blacks are susceptible to certain types of disease and
propensities for inherited illness. Such propensity, or the diseases
stemming from it, can cause much stress. In this regard, the relationship
between stress and poor health for Blacks in American is like that for
White Americans.
Blacks in America, however, must content with further sources
of health-related stress, both of which are linked to the continuing
salience of race. 99 Firstly, interpersonal relationships at work across
racial lines often lead to increased and unhealthy stress due to the
discrimination faced by African-Americans from co-workers and
employers alike.100  Of course, Whites also experience negative
treatment in the workplace, but such encounters are usually race neutral
93 Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1014.
94 See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH ACTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993)
(cited in Leets, supra note 77, at 354, 357).
95 Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1014.
96 Id.
97 Id.
9' Id. at 1015.
99 FEAGIN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 43.
"'o Id. at 43.
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or color-blind, as it were.' 10 Secondly, the long-term consequence of
American racism has meant that there exists significant "racism-
generated impoverishment."' 1 2 Such "lack" impacts a number of
societal factors from education, to health care, to housing. It means
that "...for many Blacks in America, the lack of certain types of
material assets or social-network resources can mean additional
detrimental effects on their health.' 0 3 A smaller percentage of Whites
are similarly situated hence a smaller proportion are affected by such
stress. 104
Racial abuse in the form of cross burning, for instance is an
example of a racialized stressful occurrence - an occurrence profoundly
assaultive in nature and consequence. Class does not mitigate all of the
effects of racism. The stress experienced by Blacks in America, even
when social class is controlled for, is both more frequent and more
severe than Whites.10 5 Additionally, the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow
and contemporary racism has meant that Blacks in America generally
have less socio-economic resources than their similarly situated white
counterparts. 10 6 This relative deprivation can lead to greater financial
stress and worry, even for middle class Blacks. 10 7 This in turn "can
contribute to the everyday stress that can generate pain, fiustration,
anger, and physical illness. Whites do not, on a structural and
institutional level, encounter anti-white racism or the long-term
consequences of such racism."10 8 Again, the contribution of economic
instability and experiences of racial animus produces mental and
physical health vulnerability.
Social forces of racism, coupled with economic
disadvantage, have worked against the health of Blacks in
America for centuries - this is nothing new. Further,
structural barriers such as intersecting variables of SES and
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Id.
104 id.
105 Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1017.
106 FEAGIN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 43.For instance, the average Black family
has approximately one tenth of the wealth of the average White family. Id.
107 Id. See WILLIAM A. DARITY & SAMUEL L. MYERS, PERSISTENT DISPARITY: RACE
AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, at 7-10 (1998). See
generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRA, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY (1995).
108 FEAGIN & McKINNEY, supra note 1, at 43.
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race combine to alienate men of color from health care
resources. Indeed, many of the mental health issues
plaguing Blacks in America are related to the unique
stresses experienced at the interface of poverty and
racism. 109
Of course, not all people exposed to acute or chronic stressors
develop diseases or psychiatric conditions. Admittedly, exposure to
stressors alone is not a sufficient explanation for the onset of illness,
mental or physical. Other factors must be considered such as
"...characteristics of the stressful situation, individual biological and
psychological attributes, and characteristics of the social support
systems available to the individual that serve as buffers." ' 10 The effects
of stress are dependent upon factors such as its "magnitude, intensity,
duration, unpredictability and novelty.""' Furthermore it has been
established both that there is a linear relationship between the
"magnitude of a stressor and the extent of psychiatric and physical
disability" and, that "regardless of predisposition, stressors of sufficient
intensity and duration will induce an acute stress response in all so
exposed."1 2 This is important for racialized persons subjected to racist
abuse as the cumulative effects of racism include prolonged exposure
to stress which, in turn, heightens the impact of even acute stressful
events.113 Notwithstanding societal gains which have been made in the
appreciation of American cultural and racial diversity, the persistence
of racism continues to exact a toll.
Despite significant progress in race relations and racial
tolerance in American society, African Americans continue
to be at risk for encountering day-to-day acts and
experiences of discrimination because of their racial group
membership. There is increasing evidence that everyday
experiences of racial discrimination affect the mental health
of African Americans and are related to higher levels of
psychological distress and lower levels of psychological
109 John A. Rich, The Health of African American Men, 569 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 149, 149 (2000).110 Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1018.
1" Id. Magnitude of stress includes any departure from baseline conditions, while
intensity of stress refers to the rate of change. Id.
112 i
.
113 id.
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well-being. 114
Critical psychology and sociology supports the views of critical
race theorists in establishing that in addition to overt and blatant racial
abuses, people of color are subjected to recurrent indignities and
irritations, referred to as micro-aggressions," 15 on an ongoing basis. 116
Not surprisingly, longitudinal research of concentration camp
survivors has similarly indicated that such "profound and protracted
stressful conditions" may produce lifelong effects which cannot be
reversed."17 Such critical psychology sheds light on other prolonged
114 Lionel D. Scott, Cultural Orientation and Coping With Perceived Discrimination
Among African American Youth, 29 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 235, 235 (2003) (internal
citations omitted). See generally JAMES S. JACKSON & SHERRILL L. SELLERS,
African-American Health over the Life Course: A Multidimensional Framework, in
HANDBOOK DIVERSITY ISSUES IN HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 301, 308 (Pamela M. Kato &
Traci Mann eds., 1996). See generally James S. Jackson & Monica L. Wolford,
Changes from 1979 to 1987 in Mental Health Status and Help-Seeking among African
Americans, 25 J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 15 (1992) (cited in FEAG[N & MCKINNEY,
supra note 1, at 42).
115 See, e.g., Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (where
Peggy Davis coined this term, articulating the concept of microaggression in critical
legal theory and discussing those stunning, sudden acts of racial hostility that remind
persons of color of their precarious status).
116 See, e.g., PHILOMENA ESSED, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY RACISM (1991)
(emphasizing that discrimination is a structured part of everyday experiences and
includes not only major stressful life experiences but recurrent indignities and
irritations in everyday situations) (cited in Williams, supra note 5, at 338). Another
measure, which is akin to the notion of racism as micro-aggression, considers
[E]veryday discrimination and attempts to measure more chronic,
routine, and relatively minor experiences of unfair treatment. It
assesses nine items that capture the frequency of the following
experiences in the day-to-day lives of respondents: (1)being treated
with less courtesy than others; (2)less respect than others; (3)receiving
poorer service than others in restaurants or stores; people acting as if
you are not smart, they are better than you; they think you are
dishonest; being called names or insulted; and being threatened or
harassed. Examples of such cumulative behavior include making
exclusionary decisions in college admissions, employment, treating
successful Blacks as exceptions that prove the rule of Black inferiority,
and the randomized disparate treatment which a person of color may
encounter from the bus to the boardroom. Williams, supra note 5, at
341.
117 See MARDI J. HOROWITZ, STRESS RESPONSE SYNDROMES 39 (1976) (cited in
Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1018). See generally Laura Leets,
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periods of racialized abuses such as slavery, Jim Crow"18 and racial
apartheid as it is manifested in contemporary America. It is important
to emphasize both their cumulative impact and the reciprocal
relationship between stress and the consequent response. The more
rigorous and severe the external situation, the less significant are social
and individual characteristics in determining the likelihood and nature
of the response.
When conditions are sufficiently harsh, as in wartime
situations, prolonged sensory deprivation, or concentration
camps, for example, breakdown is virtually universal and
individual variations are reflected only in the length of time
before the reaction occurs and perhaps in subsequent
recovery time. When the stressful situation is less severe,
social supports, resources and individual characteristics
contribute to an understanding of why some people become
ill and others do not.
119
The social environment in which one operates adds much to the
stress equation, or detracts from the ability to cope, as the social
position of an individual or group materially influences the experience
of stress and the vulnerabilities to chronic disease. Specifically, the
negative effects of stress are exacerbated for those suffering from social
isolation and minority group membership. 120 Accordingly, social
marginality denotes a precarious societal positioning which itself
increases vulnerability of the already marginalized. The reality of what
urban sociologists noticed long ago is evidence of the impact of societal
marginality. Specifically, deteriorating urban areas, have
disproportionably high rates of both physical and mental health
disorders. 12 1 Such marginalized and isolated societal positions create a
negative cycle with significant physical and mental health
122
consequences.
Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semetic and Antigay
Speech, 58 J. Soc. ISSUES 341 (2002).
118 See generally RICHARD WRIGHT, THE ETHICS OF LIVING JIM CROW: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH (1937).
119 Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1018.
120 Id. at 1019.
121 ROBERT E. LEE FARIS, MENTAL DISORDERS IN URBAN AREAS (University of
Chicago Press 1939) (cited in Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1019).
122 FEAGIN & MCKINNEY, supra note 1, at 34.
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... marginal social status due to membership in a low-status
group or simply in one that constitutes a numerical
minority in the area has also been associated with increased
health risks. Sheer numerical size of a given group,
sometimes referred to as ethnic density, has been found to
be inversely related to psychiatric hospitalization rates....
Presumably the smaller the community of ethnically similar
members, the less the social support available to any one
member. 1
23
While shedding a disturbing light on the consequences of
continued segregation, this critical psychology is equally distressing for
those persons with minority status operating in majority settings. 124
Hence, the ramifications for racialized persons in corporate, or
academic, America are particularly stark and implicate token status as
more than an annoyance, but as a potential health concern.
Such "vulnerability" on the part of a victim does not preclude
recovery for damages. Indeed, some tort law doctrine [] expressly
contemplates compensation for a victim who might vary from the norm
in terms of susceptibility to injury. This is extremely important given
that "[i]ndividual and family memories of past discrimination,
including recent racist events, compound the damage of everyday
discrimination. Connections between hostile epithets and acts in the
distant or recent past and those in the present are central aspects of
individual and collective memories in Black communities." 125 Social
123 Rabkin & Struening, supra note 64, at 1019 (citations omitted).
124 Critical psychologists Kessler and Neighbors have explained that:
It is... possible that the joint effects of poverty and discrimination have
synergistic effects or that financial success functions to shield blacks
from the more distressing aspects of discrimination. Any of these
processes would lead to an interaction in which the effects of race are
most pronounced at the lower end of the social class distribution.
Alternatively, race differences in distress could be most pronounced at
high levels of social class, because financially successful Black-group
members might experience the psychological stresses associated with
this marginal position. Inferential evidence consistent with this
possibility was reported in a treatment study...
Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back, supra note 87, at 90 (quoting Ronald C. Kessler
& Harold W. Neighbors, A New Perspective on the Relationships Among Race, Social
Class, and Psychological Distress, 27 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 107, 108 (1986)).
125 FEAGIN & McKNNEY, supra note 1, at 50.
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scientist who have researched collective and community memories
have determined that "collective memories of racism can multiply
racially related stress for individuals."'' 26 Indeed, Robert Bellah has
noted that "human communities have a history and 'they are constituted
by their past' - for this reason we can speak of a real community as a
'community of memory', one that does not forget its pasts." These
collective memories are not always positive: "Remembering heritage
involves accepting origins, including painful memories of prejudice and
discrimination."'
' 27
Moreover, in the case of the racially hostile or abusive
perpetrator, the infliction of harm upon their intended victims is not
accidentally, nor negligently done. Rather, the leveler of a racial abuse
and the orchestrator of racial conduct intentionally inflict harm based
upon race - this is usually calculated and premeditated behavior. For
instance, hate crimes have increased throughout American, especially
in the wake of September 11, 2001.128 Even in the absence of the most
vicious forms of racism, studies suggest that ethnic and racial
minorities experience discrimination regularly. 129 Although poverty
126 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 153 (1985) (cited in FEAGIN & McKI4NEY, supra
note 1, at 52-53).
127 Id.
128 Beth Velliquette, 3 Teens Held In Sikh Assault, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, Apr. 3,
2004, at 1, available at
http://www.sikhcoalition.org/news.asp?mainaction=viewnews&newsid=480 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006).
A Sikh student at UNC claims he and his friend were beaten by a trio of
teenagers on Franklin Street after one of them called him Osama bin
Laden. Chapel Hill police charged each of the teens with assault
inflicting serious injury and simple assault after the student identified
them shortly after the assault Sunday morning. Although police
categorized the assault as a hate crime, they did not charge the teens
with ethnic intimidation -- the state statute that covers hate crimes.
Chapel Hill Police Chief Gregg Jarvies said the charge of ethnic
intimidation was not filed because it was not clear whether the assault
occurred because of the victim's race, clothing or religion. The charge
of ethnic intimidation would have to be provable, Jarvies said. "You
may believe one thing, but we can't prove it," he said. Id.
129 See, e.g., David Goldberg & Matthew Hodes, The Poison Of Racism and The Self-
Poisoning of Adolescents, 14 J. FAMILY THERAPY 51 (1992); John Dovidio, The
Subtlety of Racism, 47 TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT 51 (1993) (cited in Vetta L.
Sanders, Perceived Experiences of Racism as Stressful Life Events, 32 COMMUNITY
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most certainly plays a role in the mental health of Blacks in America,
critical psychological factors suggest that racism may play as large, or
perhaps an even larger role, than social class.1 30 Measures of SES are
not equivalent across racial groups.' 31 For instance, there are racial
differences in income returns for a given level of education, the quality
of education, the level of wealth associated with a given level of
income, the purchasing power of income, the stability of employment
and the health risks associated with working in particular occupations.
"Further, it has been emphasized that SES is not just a confounder of
the relationship between race and health, but part of the causal pathway
by which race affects health.' 32 Accordingly, "race is an antecedent
and determinant of SES, and SES differences between blacks and
whites reflect, in part the impact of economic discrimination as
produced by large-scale societal structures.' 33 Hence, even after
adjustment for SES, the salience of race as a societal force negatively
impacting the health of people of color in America is evidenced by the
concretization of disparate health consequences. 134 Racism is a
powerful variable in Black mental health, specifically the prevalence
and incidence of symptoms and disorders. Racism is also an important
variable with regards to racial differences in mental health-related
behaviors such as coping, seeking psychotherapy and remaining in and
complying with treatment.' 
35
Race, although a social construct, exposes Blacks in America to
highly stressful experiences.' 36 According to the Department of Health
MENTAL HEALTH J. 224 (1996)). National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Hate
Crimes Resources Facts and Figures, http://www.ncjrs.org/hatecrimes/facts.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2004); Human Rights Campaign, 2002 FBI Hate Crimes
Statistics,
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/HRC/GetInformed/Issues/HateCrime
sl/BackgroundInformation5/2002_FBIHateCrimesStatistics.htm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2004).
130 Elizabeth A. Klonoff et al., Racial Discrimination and Psychiatric Symptoms
Among Blacks, 5 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 329, 333
(1999).
131 Continued segregation is an example of a societal structure that restricts the socio-
economic opportunity and mobility of people of color. Williams, supra note 5, at 337.
132 Id. at 337.
133 Id.
134 Williams, supra note 5, at 338.
135 Elizabeth A. Klonoff et al., Racial Discrimination and Psychiatric Symptoms
Among Blacks, 5 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 329, 333.
136 See generally C. Mack, A Theoretical Model of Psychosomatic Illness in Blacks
and An Innovative Treatment Strategy, 7 J. BLACK PSYCH. 27 (1980) (cited in Marcia
E. Sutherland & Jules P. Harrell, Individual Differences in Physiological Responses to
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and Human Services "Black Americans have a greater chance than
White Americans of dying of stress-related illnesses, including cancer
and heart disease.' ' 37 Not only do personal experiences of racism
disparately impact Blacks in America, but specific knowledge of the
experiences of friends and relatives, combined with collective
memories of racism in America, can result in cumulative or multiplied
racially related stress. 138 Furthermore, there is a spiral effect whereby
the psychic implications of racism feed into physical manifestations,
which again cycle back upon the psyche. Indeed, a Harvard University
and Kaiser Foundation study confirms the correlation between elevated
blood pressure levels in Blacks and self-reported experiences of
discrimination. 139 The researchers concluded that "reported experiences
of racial discrimination, along with self-reported responses to unfair
treatment, were associated with high blood pressure" and that the
reported experiences of racial discrimination "could contribute to
Black-White differences in blood pressure among young adults." 140
Furthermore, focus on the emotional distress of racial hostility
reveals applicable critical psychology and medical information capable
of informing the tort law objective test, as discussed below.
Fearful, Racially Noxious and Neutral Imagery, 6 IMAGINATION, COGNITION &
PERSONALITY 133 (1986)).
137 S.R. Greg, The Black-White Health Gap: Disparity Widening Congressional
Caucus is Told, WASHINGTON POST, October 10, 1984, at C5.
138 FEAGIN & McKINNEY, supra note 1, at 52. See also, Joe R. Feagin and Melvin P.
Sikes, Living with Racism: The Black Middle Class Experience (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1994); JAMES S. JACKSON & MARITA R. INGLEHART, Reverberation Theory:
Stress and Racism in Hierarchically Structured Communities, in EXTREME STRESS
AND COMMUNITIES: IMPACT AND INTERVENTION 353-373 (Steven E. Hobfoll &
Marten W. deVries eds., 1995).
139 Nancy Krieger & Stephen Sidney, Racial Discrimination and Blood Pressure: The
CARDIA Study of Young Black and White Adults, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1370,
1373-74 (1996). See Camille A. Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back: A Consideration
of Mitigatory Criminal Defenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 77 (2003).
140 Marjorie A. Bowman & David E. Nicklin, New Guide to Clinical Preventive
Services Published by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force: Depression and
Other Stressors Associated with Hypertension, 227 JAMA 1857, 1857 (1997) ("[T]he
increased prevalence of hypertension in African Americans may reflect stresses of
racial discrimination, particularly for those who remain silent in the face of perceived
oppression."). See Shawn 0. Utsey, Racism and the Psychological Well-Being of
African American Men, 3 J. AFR. AM. MEN 69, 84 (1997) ("Contemporary African
American men also face risks in responding to their oppression in what might be
perceived as an aggressive fashion. Responding to societal cues to temper all direct
objections to their racial oppression, African American men often direct these
hostilities inward.").
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Specifically, a Duke University study indicated that "African
Americans experience increased cardiovascular reactivity and
emotional distress when confronted with racist provocation.'
14 1
Researchers concluded "the racist provocation condition produced
greater increases in [cardiovascular] and emotional self-report measures
[i.e., anger, resentment, cynicism, and anxiety] than did the
controversial but nonracist condition."'142 Of note, "the greatest
cardiovascular reactivity was observed when the minority subjects were
speaking in response to the racist provocation versus merely listening."
Further, researchers found that the "recovery period", the time during
which the subjects' cardiovascular activity returns to pre-stress levels,
lasted for at least ten minutes after the end of the confrontation. 143 This
reveals a durable level of distress experienced by racialized subjects.
Whether the reasonable person would exhibit similar symptomology is
likely irrelevant to the person so abused and seeking compensation. 1
44
D. Racial Hostility and the Link to Other Stressors
Is it a legitimate hypothesis that mental illness may be exacerbated, or
caused, by racism? 4 5 The case of those suffering from agoraphobia
provides a simple example. In the course of treatment, therapists
attempt exposure based management of symptoms in order to overcome
fear engendered by going outside or attending in public spaces.
141 Maya McNeilly et al., Effects of Racist Provocation and Social Support on
Cardiovascular Reactivity in African American Women, 2 INT'L J. BEHAV. MED. 321,
321-22 (1995) (cited in Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation and the
Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 529 (2003) [hereinafter
Smith, Everyday Indignities]). The Duke researchers subjected a group of thirty black
women, all of normal health, to individual conversations with a white "challenger"
who engaged them on controversial topics of a racial and non-racial nature. Id
142 Id
143 Id. at 334. These carryover effects may lead to vascular pathology in minorities.
Id.144 Of course, I have advocated previously for subjectivization of such objective tests.
See Camille A. Nelson, (En) Gaged or (En)Raged: The Implications of Racial
Context to the Canadian Provocation Defence, 35 U. RICH L. REv. 1007 (2002);
Camille A. Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back: A Consideration of Mitigatory
Criminal Defenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 77
(2003). As such, one can certainly attempt to infuse the reasonable person with the
subjective information developed by the critical medical information.
145 Racism has been defined as a symbolic system organizing a range of social
inequalities and negative associations and judgments construed around the concept of
race. David Mason, On the Dangers of Disconnecting Race and Racism, 28
SOCIOLOGY 845, 855 (1994). See infra n.57 (providing a general definition of race).
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However, Blacks in America often encounter daily hassles which
exacerbate the likelihood of panic attacks. For instance, the daily hassle
of "being glared at when one sits next to a white person on the bus,
being asked for extra identification when one tries to cash a check at a
bank, and being told that the health club one wants to join is not
currently accepting new members[,]"14 6aggravate the condition itself
and decrease the likelihood of successful treatment sessions.
If clients already dread entering a restaurant (due to fear of
a panic attack), it is not helpful for them to be stared at
when they finally summon the courage to go to an upscale
restaurant. When agoraphobics undergoing exposure by
standing in a long grocery checkout line then feel snubbed
when cashiers place the change on the counter instead of in
the client's hands, feelings of anger, humiliation, and
sadness may be aroused and interfere with the habituation
of anxiety. 1
47
By engaging the mental health literature, it may be possible to
determine what, if any, role racism plays in creating, or exacerbating,
mental illness. "Studies of the mental health of Blacks generally report
that, compared to Whites, Blacks have higher levels of psychological
distress and lower levels of subjective well-being."' 4 8 There is
increasing psychological and physiological evidence to support the
existence of racism-related disorders.
One of the most firmly established and frequently reported
patterns in the distribution of health status in the United
States is that African Americans (or blacks) have higher
rates of death, disease and disability than whites have. This
pattern has been documented for over 150 years (Krieger)
and in 1990 blacks had higher rates than whites for 13 of
the 15 leading causes of death in the United States
(National Center for Health Statistics). 149
Given the revelations of critical psychology and sociology, if a
victim of racial abuse wished to pursue a legal remedy based upon her
146 WILLIAMS & CHAMBLESS, supra note 68, at 159.
147 Id.
148 Williams, supra note 5, at 336.
"' Id. at 336.
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racial victimization, what avenues are available to her? While the
options might not be intuitive, there is reason for guarded optimism in
the capacity of some traditional tort law doctrine to embrace social
science developments, including critical psychology and sociology.
PART II: RECONSIDERING TORT LAW
"But the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but
bring the inevitable self-questioning, self-
disparagement, and lowering of ideals which ever
accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of
contempt and hate. "150
The capacity of tort law doctrine to actualize equality-seeking norms
can be analyzed by problematizing a widely reported St. Louis incident.
In Green Acres, north St. Louis County, an ongoing controversy
between two neighbors was featured in the press.151 Keith Allen
Dagenais, one of the neighbors, was accused of disturbing the peace
and destruction of property and was under a court order to leave his
neighbors alone. In response he erected a sign reading, "[t]his is our
property. Thou shalt not take.
152
The feud started when Mr. Dagenais and his housemate moved
in. The dispute initially centered on a paved parking space shared by
the neighbors. A standoff began after Mr. Dagenais, who is White,
insisted that Ms. McIntosh, who is Black, remove part of the driveway
slabs that crossed onto his property line, while Ms. McIntosh insisted
that the city had ordered her to construct the driveway as it existed. Of
direct relevance for purposes of this article, McIntosh has alleged that
Dagenais erected a cross on the driveway, called her racist names, hung
a black doll by the neck in his window which faces her house, and
damaged her side of the driveway when he used a sledgehammer to
break up the pavement on his side. Not only are there racial issues, but
there are shadows of the occult as Dagenais' response to the allegations
was that he was practicing witchcraft not racism. 153
150 W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 7-9 (Bantam Books 1989).
151 Denise Hollinshed, FBI May Decide Whether Neighbors' Dispute Is Witchcraft -
Or Racism, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2003, at B2.
152 id.
153 These events are described in police reports:
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In terms of this article's goal of reconceptualizing tort law to
further the goal of racial recompense, it is relevant that McIntosh, lived
with her children, aged 10 and 15 at the time of the incidents. In the
press, McIntosh indicated that her 10-year-old daughter needed therapy
and is now afraid to play outside due to the activities of Mr. Dagenais.
She was quoted in the press as saying, "[e]verybody just blows this up
as a driveway issue and it isn't." "When I walk out my door and when I
pull up, I don't know what's coming," she added. "I have two children
... and I don't want anything to happen to them." McIntosh eventually
got an order of protection barring Dagenais and his housemate from
abusing, threatening, molesting or stalking her and from
communicating with her in any manner.'
On July 26, Dagenais constructed a wooden cross, placed it on the
driveway and poured a liquid over the cross. The report says he was
wearing a black skull cap and a black turtleneck. Dagenais said that for
years he has practiced Wicca, a belief whose adherents practice a form
of witchcraft. "I put up a cross. I was sitting out there in black trying to
scare them," he said. "I didn't dress in a white cloak like the Ku Klux
Klan."
On Aug. 15, McIntosh's estranged husband was at her house and saw a
black-faced doll clothed and hanging by the neck in a porch window of
Dagenais' house, facing toward the McIntosh home. The police report
stated that a crucifix had been applied to the window with tape, and the
garage door was painted with the number "666," a biblical reference to
the devil. Subdivision trustees told Dagenais to remove the items.
Dagenais said the doll was actually a black cat figure dressed in a
brown dress.
On Dec. 2, McIntosh arrived home to find her neighbor's vehicle
partially blocking her driveway. When she got out of her car, Dagenais
called her by a series of offensive names. Dagenais told police he had
been raking leaves and drinking wine and had moved the car to sweep
leaves. "Before I had a chance to move my car, Patricia got out of her
car and swore at me. I in turn swore at her," he said. Id.
154 Id. Subsequently, Police charged Dagenais with three counts of disturbing the
peace and one count of destruction of property, with each count punishable by fines
of up to $1,000. Id. Police have also sent their files to the FBI to determine whether
the complaints can be prosecuted as a hate crime. Id.
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A. Intent and Negligence Distinguished
Not surprisingly, Mr. Dagenais has articulated both a lack of racial
animus and a lack of racist intent in his actions. 155 Considering civil
remedies provided under tort law, it is important to recognize that
intent and negligence are entirely different concepts. "The Defendant
has the intent to achieve a specified result when the defendant either (1)
has a purpose 56 to accomplish that result or (2) lacks such a purpose
but knows to a substantial certainty' 57 that the defendant's actions will
bring about the result.' '158 Intent is not a general state of mind. One
155 Dagenais has said he is not racist, but was following practices of his Wiccan
philosophy to protect his home. See Patricia Rice, Vigil Aims to Soothe Neighbors'
Dispute, ST. LOuIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2003, at B2.
156 See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §24, at 48.
The Purpose Test: Suppose the defendant attempts to hit a target by
firing a rifle from a great distance. It may be unlikely that he can do so,
but it is his purpose to do so if he can. Under the first clause, he has
intent to hit the target because he has a purpose to do so. The intent is
not necessarily tortious or wrong; to see whether the defendant has
committed a tort will require other steps in proof and reasoning. The
illustration given merely shows the intent element in what may or may
not turn out to be a tort. Id.
157 See id.
The Certainty Test: Suppose that the defendant puts sleeping powders
in the food served by the cafeteria at a summer camp. His purpose is
limited: He knows X will eat the food and wishes to put X to sleep.
By the purpose clause, the defendant does not intend to put other to
sleep at all. However, if he knows that others will also be eating the
cafeteria food at the same time, he must know to a substantial or virtual
certainty that they, too, will be affected. Under the certainty clause of
the intent definition, the defendant intends to affect others who eat the
same cafeteria food at the same time. Mere risk, however, even a very
high risk, is not enough to show substantial certainty.
The substantial certainty is focused on the Plaintiff and on the source of
the harm and a particular time and place. It will not suffice to say that
the defendant maintains a dangerous condition on his land that, over a
period of years, is almost certain to cause injury to someone. That
might be negligence, but it is not an intent to harm or to commit any
trespassory tort. Id.
158 Id.
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has a purpose to, or substantial certainty, of accomplishing an
objective. As stated by Dobbs, "the defendant might intend to touch
and also intend his touching to have harmful effects." These are two
different intents. 159
As a state of mind, intent is defmitionally subjective - it is in
the mind of the tortfeasor. Conversely negligence is objective and is
measured according to external norms of appropriate and expected
behavior. "Thus a defendant is negligent if he departs from the standard
of care expected of people generally, but he is not necessarily acting
intentionally merely because other people acting in like circumstances
would harbor intent."1 60 According to Dobbs, "negligence, therefore,
entails unreasonably risky conduct with the emphasis on risk as it
would be perceived by the reasonable person. Any given act may be
intentional or it may be negligent, but it cannot be both, as intent and
negligence are regarded as mutually exclusive grounds for liability."
'16
'
Therefore a tortfeasor, who while aware of a risk decides nonetheless to
engage in risky behavior, lacking the high level mental requirement for
"intentional tortious" conduct, will be liable for negligence. 62 In this
way, negligence law may serve as a catch all or non-intentional default
category for arguably non-intentional conduct falling below societal
expectations.
As will be discussed below, there might be some legitimate
creative use of intentional tort law doctrine capable of providing racial
recompense in situations such as the Dagenais-McIntosh hypothetical.
Generally, however, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress might not be the preferred legal strategy for those
seeking compensation in such circumstances. An alleged tortfeasor,
such as Mr. Dagenais, may indeed create risks of harm without having
either a defined purpose or certainty that harm will result - this lack of
mens rea, if you will, would prevent application of intentional tort law
doctrine. As such, a conception of negligent racism, whereby the
plaintiffs focus is not on establishing the defendant's purpose or the
certainty required to show intent, is likely better doctrine to achieve
racial recompense. 163 The analysis that follows will, accordingly, focus
on why negligence doctrine may be preferable for articulating such
159 Id. at 49.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 51.
162 See id. at 50.
163 See Smith, Everyday Indignities, supra note 141, at 529-35 (analyzing concept of
negligent racism as a basis for reconsideration of title VII doctrine).
2005]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
claims. Since, negligence does not require a state of mind at all, but
focuses instead on the outward conduct, an alleged tortfeasor, like Mr.
Dagenais in the above hypothetical, might nonetheless be liable for
compensating the McIntosh family.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
While the utterer of racial invective knowingly intends to inflict harm,
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress presents a difficult
avenue for victims of racial abuse seeking compensation. "The rule
which seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct
exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature
which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress
of a very serious kind."
1 64
Given the critical psychology, the criteria that "[t]he emotional
distress must in fact exist, and it must be severe"' 65 would not seem to
be the main hurdle. Instead, intentional infliction of emotional distress
would not likely lead to racial recompense for the McIntosh family due
to the requirement that recovery be limited, unless it is established that
the distress caused was "severe," "extreme" or "outrageous."' 166 In
addressing the threshold for a successful claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress the American Law Institute, the drafters of the
Second Restatement of Torts, stated:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an
intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his
conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive
164 Eckenrode v. Life America Insurance Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(g) (1964) ("in short, the rule stated in this
section imposes liability for intentionally causing severe emotional distress in those
situations in which the actor's conduct has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of
*decency. The prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of decent men and
women in a civilized community is considered outrageous and intolerable. Generally,
the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim
'Outrageous!"'). See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
61 & n.54 (5th ed. 1984).
165 WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 63 (1984).
166 See RANDAL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME
WORD 81-88 (2002); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, andNamecalling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 133,151 (1982).
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damages for another tort. Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!
167
[Emphasis added]
It is the potential for abstracted (e)raced objective criteria,
demanding that the facts so outrage the hypothetical reasonable person,
which often sounds the death knell in cases involving racial
invective. 168 Specifically, the construction of the reasonable person is a
cite of much controversy and debate. 169 Indeed, it is unclear to what
extent this hypothetical ordinary person will be contextualized and
infused with relevant criteria i.e. sex, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, age, mental vulnerabilities and the intersections of these
identity variables. Thus, the ordinary person is often not perturbed by
racial animus, certainly not to the extent of the subjectivized reasonable
person, i.e. the reasonable Black child confronted with racially
derogatory imagery. In addition to the high watermark for
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964).
168 CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM (New York University Press 2003).
169 Id.; Nelson, supra note 144, at 1007. See generally Stanley Yeo, Proportionality
in Criminal Defences, 12 CRIM. L.J. 211 (1988); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed. 2001).
170 As I stated in (En) Gaged or (En)Raged: The Implications of Racial Context to the
Canadian Provocation Defence, there is a need to contextualize and infuse reasonable
person:
At some point it becomes necessary, in the interest of justice, to
consider some of the attributes which the accused does not share with
the ordinary person. For example, the potentially provocative impact of
the desecration of a crucifix might only be understood if the ordinary
person is catholic, whereas the same event for an agnostic or an atheist
may be a matter of indifference. Similarly, it may be pointless to ask
what the effect on an ordinary person would be of the desecration of the
Koran, if the ordinary person were not Muslim. To fully appreciate and
appropriately consider the provocative impact of the desecration of a
synagogue, the reasonable person constructed should be Jewish.
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outrageous conduct, the traditional objective standard adds to the
difficulty of obtaining a successful result under the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The infusion of this tort law doctrine
with critical psychology might, however, be informative and provide a
basis for racial recompense.
Indeed, there might be a foundation for such recompense built
upon the line of reasoning found in the famous Hadley v. Baxendale
case. 171 If the tortfeasor knows of the heightened sensitivities of the
plaintiff, such as vulnerabilities flowing from racial abuse, the
tortfeasor may similarly have a heightened duty of care. In this way,
conduct which is normally acceptable, or even protected, is legally
problematized due to the actual knowledge of the tortious
wrongdoer. 72
The case of Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden 73 is apt. The defendants'
conduct toward the plaintiff was even more extreme and outrageous
than in Alcorn, where a finding of emotional distress was made. 7FTwo
Nelson, supra note 144, at 1025. See generally LEE, supra note 168; Yeo, supra note
169, at 211; DRESSLER, supra note 169.
171 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch. 341 (stating that a breaching party is only
responsible for consequential damages flowing from a breach of contract to the extent
that damages are within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, or
are reasonably foreseeable).
172 Bridges ex rel. Bridges v. Park Place Entertainment, 860 So.2d 811 (2003);
Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Investments, Inc., 828 F.Supp. 346 (E.D.P.A. 1993);
Eddy v. Casey's General Store, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 633 (1992). See also Alcorn v.
Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 498 (1970) (shouting racial insults and then
firing employee is indeed outrageous. Held an employer's conduct toward a Black
employee was extreme and outrageous, and found an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress where the employer, standing in a position of authority over
plaintiff, aware of his particular susceptibility to emotional distress, and for the
purpose of causing plaintiff to suffer such distress, intentionally humiliated plaintiff,
insulted his race [by calling him a "nigger"]).
173 Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959 (Md.1993).
174Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 216 (1970):
"Complaint that after Negro truck driver informed Caucasian field
superintendent that driver, as shop steward, had advised another not to
drive a certain truck superintendent intentionally disparaged driver's
race in a rude, violent insolent manner for purpose of causing
emotional and physical distress, that superintendent's conduct was
ratified with knowledge that driver's emotional and physical distress
would thereby increase and that as result thereof driver suffered
emotional and physical distress and was sick for several weeks and
unable to work and had sustained shock, nausea and insomnia, stated
cause of action, as against general demurrer, but that statutes referring
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of Caldor's security personnel imprisoned a teenager in a tiny room for
many hours, preventing him from leaving or calling his parents. They
threatened him, interrogated him and coerced a false confession from
him. When he later voluntarily returned to the store with his mother to
resolve the situation, other management personnel called him a
"nigger" and told him that he would "burn" for the crime he did not
commit, presumably because of his race. They cuffed his hands behind
his back and marched him handcuffed through a public area to add to
his humiliation.
Despite such extreme and outrageous conduct, the plaintiff was
required by the majority to make a strong showing with regard to the
severity of the emotional distress. For instance, the plaintiff was
required to demonstrate that the emotional distress was so severe as to
disable him for an indefinite period from performing all of his principal
daily activities. Interestingly, in an opinion which acknowledges the
cumulative affects of racism and specifically speaks the language of
abuse, the dissenting judge astutely found that the teenage plaintiff was
entitled to recover on the basis of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Finally, the majority's requirement that, to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, one must have
suffered a "disabling emotional response that hindered his
ability to carry out his daily activities" ... will likely work
against many members of groups which have, unfortunately
and through no fault of their own, suffered more
discrimination, harassment and abuse in our society than
that suffered by the majority of individuals. Many members
of certain minority and socio-economic groups, who have
suffered discrimination and abuse, have developed a
tougher hide than many other persons. Many of those who
have more frequently been the victims of outrageous
conduct have developed, from experience and necessity,
the ability to continue functioning in their daily activities.
While the emotional hurt may be as strong or stronger, the
ability to function normally may be greater. Under the
majority's formulation of the tort, however, those persons
who are able to carry on with their principal daily
activities will not be able to recover damages for their
to equal accommodations did not encompass discrimination in
employment."
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severe emotional distress resulting from extreme and
outrageous intentional conduct. In its application, the tort
will discriminate against those who have developed a
degree of resiliency because of past discrimination. This
result is contrary to logic, fairness, and our prior
opinions. 175
Ultimately in ruling for the plaintiff, the court overcame the
stringent intent requirement by determining that the jury could have
inferred from the evidence that the defendants' "suspicions" were
merely pretexts, and that the defendants' had ulterior motives.
Additionally, the jury was entitled to infer from the racial slur and
statement of Caldor's manager, coupled with the other egregious
conduct by Caldor's personnel, that the defendants were motivated by
racial hostility.
Thus the real impediment to this doctrine, involves not the
assessment of distress, to which the critical medical information is
informative, but rather the requirement of intention. The doctrine as
originally conceived insisted on substantial certainty. However, as
Dobbs has analyzed, there may actually be greater elasticity in the
examination of intentionality than originally formulated. This
interpretation of a flexible, more realistic, intent standard may provide
a glimmer of hope for victims of racialized abuses. Specifically, those
who consciously disregard the impact of their racial abuse should be
held accountable as reckless in the least.
In the great majority of the cases allowing recovery, the
mental distress has been inflicted intentionally, the
defendant either desiring to cause it or knowing that it was
substantially certain to follow from the conduct. There are,
however, a few cases which indicate that liability for
extreme outrage is broader and extends to situations in
which there is no certainty, but merely a high degree of
probability that the mental distress will follow, and the
defendant goes ahead in conscious disregard of it. This is
the type of conduct that is commonly called willful or
wanton, or reckless. 
176
175 Caldor, 625 A.2d at 980 (emphasis added).
176 WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 64 (1984).
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C. Battery
A battery is harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from
an act intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer such contact.1 77 The
restatement formula is that the defendant must intend a "harmful or
offensive contact." 178 Accordingly, the hallmark of battery is
intentional nonconsensual harmful touching. Specifically, "intent to
touch in a way the defendant understands is not consented to is
sufficient. So is an actual intent to harm. The question is whether the
plaintiff shows intent by showing merely an intent to touch that turned
out to be offensive or harmful, or whether she must show that the harm
or offense was also intended."'' 79 While ambiguous, Dobbs states that
the restatement formula likely requires dual intent to harm or offend, as
well as an intent to touch. 8 '
Traditionally courts have recognized tangible forms of touching
as battery, i.e. plaintiffs are touched if struck by a bullet or if
intentionally poisoned from a substance left in her cup.181 Intangibles,
such as gases, smoke and odors, have not been as easily recognized in
battery cases despite their physical presence.' 
82
Accordingly, the defendant must respect the plaintiffs
apparent wishes to avoid intentional bodily contact.
Hostile, aggressive, or harmful touching are batteries
because the plaintiff wishes to avoid them. But the
plaintiffs right to avoid unwanted intentional contact does
not depend upon the defendant's hostile intent or even upon
the reasonableness of the plaintiff's wishes.' 83
The restatement states that the tortfeasor is subject to liability
for causing bodily contact that is either harmful or offensive in that it
177 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
178 Id.
179 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 58.
0 Id. at 59.
181 Snouffer v. Snouffer, 621 N.E.2d 879 (1993) (cited in DOBBS, supra note 156, at
61).
182 McCracken v. O.B. Sloan, 252 S.E.2d 250 (1979) (upholding smokers' rights ad
refusing to find battery) (cited in DOBBS, supra note 156, at 56 n.11, 61 n.3).
"However, several decisions have found a battery resulting from smoke, with the
qualification that the defendant must have a purpose to harm or offend and is not
liable for merely substantial certainty touchings." DOBBS, supra note 156, at 61.
183 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 54.
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"infringes a reasonable sense of personal dignity."' 184 Accordingly, "[a]
person is entitled to refuse well-intentioned medical treatment as well
as the bumptious grappling of an unwelcome swain."' 85 Accordingly,
the protection of such dignitary interests may prove beneficial to
victims seeking racial recompense for racialized abuses.
Admittedly, the battery doctrine's general requirement of
physical contact may act as a bar to recovery where the tortfeasors
behavior does not include physical touching or contact of the sort
outlined above.' 86 Of course, where there is such contact, the doctrine
may prove useful for victims of racial abuse, but in the case of the far
more prevalent insult combined with gesture or gesticulation, other tort
law doctrines may be of greater assistance. While there would likely be
fear of such contact in the Dagenais-Mclntosh matter thereby rendering
the intentional tort of assault a more viable option, Fisher v. Carrousel
Motor187 thereby reveals that there is still one avenue worth considering
within the intentional tort of battery.
Emmit E. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor, Inc., et al.,188 involved a
suit for actual and exemplary damages from an alleged assault and
battery. Fisher, a Black man, was a mathematician with an agency of
NASA. The defendants were the Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., the Brass
Ring Club, which was located inside the hotel, and Mr. Robert Flynn
an employee of the hotel and manager of the club. The issue before the
Supreme Court of Texas was whether there was evidence of an
actionable battery and, further, whether such a finding should lead to an
award of exemplary damages for the malicious conduct of Mr. Flynn.
Fisher had been invited to a meeting, which included a
luncheon, to be held at the Carrousel Hotel. Fisher confirmed he would
attend the meeting by phone. After the morning session of the
meetings, the group of between 25 and 30 guests went to the Brass
Ring Club for the luncheon. The court decision states, "[t]he luncheon
was buffet style, and Fisher stood in line with others and just ahead of a
graduate student of Rice University who testified at the trial. As Fisher
was about to be served, he was approached by Flynn, who snatched the
plate from Fisher's hand and shouted that he, a Negro, could not be
184 Id. at 62. "A touching that would not ordinarily offend a reasonable sense of
personal dignity would presumably not be against the plaintiff's wishes, in the
absence of some expression to the contrary". Id.
185 Id. at 54.
186 See Delgado, supra note 19.
187 Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
188 Id.
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served in the club."
While Fisher testified that he had not actually been touched, nor
did he suffer fear or apprehension of physical injury, he did testify that,
"he was highly embarrassed and hurt by Flynn's conduct in the
presence of his associates." At trial, the jury found that "Flynn had
'forcibly dispossessed plaintiff of his dinner plate and 'shouted in a
loud and offensive manner' that Fisher could not be served there, thus
subjecting Fisher to humiliation and indignity." The jury further
determined that Mr. Flynn had acted maliciously thus awarding Fisher
$400 actual damages for the humiliation and indignity caused him and
$500 exemplary damages for Flynn's malicious conduct.
Interestingly, the Court of Civil Appeals held there was no
assault since there was no physical contact and no fear or apprehension
of physical contact. "However, the court emphasized that it has long
been settled that there can be a battery without an assault, and that
actual physical contact is not necessary to constitute a battery, so long
as there is contact with clothing or an object closely identified with the
body."' 189 The court relied upon Prosser, Law of Torts which said:
The interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted
contacts with the plaintiffs person is protected by an action
for the tort commonly called battery. The protection
extends to any part of the body, or to anything which is
attached to it and practically identified with it. Thus contact
with the plaintiffs clothing, or with a cane, a paper, or any
other object held in his hand will be sufficient .... The
plaintiffs interest in the integrity of his person includes all
those things which are in contact or connected with it.'
90
As such, the intentional grabbing of plaintiffs plate by Mr.
Flynn constituted a battery. "The intentional snatching of an object
from one's hand is as clearly an offensive invasion of his person as
would be an actual contact with the body."' 91 "To constitute an assault
and battery, it is not necessary to touch the plaintiffs body or even his
clothing; knocking or snatching anything from plaintiffs hand or
touching anything connected with his person, when, done in an
'89 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 216 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 18, 19 (1965).
190 PROSSER, supra note 164, at 39.
191 WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 32 (3rd ed. 1964).
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offensive manner, is sufficient." 192 The rationale for holding an
offensive contact with an extension of a person to be a battery is
explained in the Restatements as follows:
Since the essence of the plaintiffs grievance consists in the
offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and
not in any physical harm done to his body, it is not
necessary that the plaintiffs actual body be disturbed.
Unpermitted and intentional contacts with anything so
connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as
part of the other's person and therefore as partaking of its
inviolability is actionable as an offensive contact with his
person. There are some things such as clothing or a cane or,
indeed, anything directly grasped by the hand which are so
intimately connected with one's body as to be universally
regarded as part of the person. 193 [Emphasis added]
Thus, conceptually there might exist a zone of proximity
beyond the physical body, yet deserving of tort law protection. This
zone is important to those subjected to racial terrorism as the
techniques of racial abuse are often more subtle than in yesteryear.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for the manifestation of racial
microaggressions to take the form of snatching items or utensils from
the hand of a racialized persons, or the dropping or throwing of
currency at the person etc. Indignities du jour 194 often involves such
contact which is humiliating and offensive.
D. Assault
The intentional tort of assault protects "the interest in freedom from
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact."' 95 Accordingly, the
contact itself is not the focus of assault - rather that is the domain of
battery. Thus for there to be an assault there need not be any actual
contact as the plaintiff is "protected against.. .purely mental
192 Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 So.2d 510 1941) Prosser, supra note 191,
at 32.
'9' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).
194 Patricia J. Williams, Notes from a Small World, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6,
1996, at 87, 92. See supra n.153.
195 PROSSER, supra note 164, at 43.
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disturbance[s].,', 96 It is important, therefore, to recognize that an assault
"may constitute any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of
a battery."' 97 The assault law requirement that the plaintiff apprehend
physical injury or touching should not be an insurmountable hurdle for
victims of racial abuses as many victims of racial insults and
accompanying gestures do indeed fear for their safety, and indeed their
lives, at the time of the racial terrorism. As the "apprehension must be
one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable
person," to successfully claim assault on the basis of racial abuse, this
"fear-factor" should not be located in the (e)raced mind of the
hypothetical reasonable man, abstracted to the point of being raceless
and genderless.198 Thus, the prospects for successful litigation may be
determined by the ability of the judge and jury to consider the
reasonable person as racialized within an historical and political
context.
"An assault is an act that is intended to and does place the
plaintiff in apprehension of an immediate unconsented-to touching that
would amount to a battery."' 199 The subjective focus of this intentional
tort is useful for the racially victimized plaintiff as it is her subjective
recognition or apprehension that is central to this tortious conduct -
subjective fear or apprehension of touching is thereby protected.2 0 0 As
an intentional tort, "intent may be based either on the defendant's
purpose or on his substantial certainty that a trespassory tort will
occur."2 0' Once the plaintiff apprehends an imminent battery from the
tortious purpose, the defendant is liable for the assault. 202
"Many opinions have asserted that the plaintiffs apprehension
must be reasonable or well-founded, that the defendant must have the
apparent present ability to complete the battery, and that words alone,
without accompanying action, cannot count as an assault., 20 3 However,
196 Id. at 43. Prosser notes that this action is the first recognition of a mental, as
distance from a physical, injury as there is a "touching of the mind, if not the body."
Id.
197 Id.
198 See id
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21, 32.
200 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 63, 64.
201 Id. at 64 ("In the case of a secondary or extended assault, the defendant may be
held liable if his misconduct is directed at a third person but miscarries so that it is the
plaintiff who apprehends the immediate or "imminent" touching.").
202 Id.
203 Muslow v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 509 So.2d 1012 (La. App. 1987)
("reasonable apprehension" based on "present ability"); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 400
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even words alone cases tend to recognize that words must be
interpreted in light of circumstances and may, therefore, count as an
assault.2 °4 The apparent reality of the threat, based on circumstances
and context, not form, is what matters. This is an important reality
check for a racially abused person whose assessment of a hostile
environment may be based upon a different lived reality than a majority
tortfeasor.2 °5 Indeed, the threat of an imminent touching need not be
explicit or verbal.
There is a temporal caveat. Although the plaintiff need not labor
under fear, since apprehension or recognition of a threatened touching
will suffice,2 °6 she must believe the threatened battery is imminent.20 7
Accordingly, if the plaintiff is able to flee or if the battery will likely be
delayed or prohibited, there is no assault.20 8 "Future danger or a
threatening atmosphere without reason to expect some immediate
touching, in other words, is not enough.,
20 9
Like the negligence rule, assault might be a helpful doctrine for
plaintiffs facing situations like that presented in the Dagenais-Mclntosh
matter. As intentional torts provide an area in which the "forseeability"
limitation on recovery may be cast aside, in so far as the extent of the
S.E.2d 472 (1991) ("reasonable apprehension, apparent ability") (cited in DOBBS,
supra note 156, at 65).
20 See Muslow, 509 So.2d at 1012; Johnson v. Bolinger, 356 S.E.2d 378 (1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (cited in DOBBS, supra note 156, at 65).
In one sense there is no such thing as a "words alone" case; all words
occur in a social context and that context may reinforce and add
substance to the verbal threat.
DOBBS, supra note 156, at 65. See Johnson v. Bollinger, 356 S.E.2d 378 (1987) ("I'll
get you," spoken by a defendant who wears a pistol in violation of the law may be an
assault even though he does not draw the pistol); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 31 modifies the traditional statement by adding that threatening words may suffice if
accompanied by action or circumstances that put the plaintiff in reasonable
apprehension of imminent battery.
205 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 65.
206 Courts often define assault in terms of the plaintiff's fear of an imminent touching,
but this is probably not literal, as much as it is a recognition that a touching is
threatened. See, e.g., Lamb v. State, 613 A.2d 402 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (words
like fear sometimes used loosely as shorthand for apprehension, but fear is not
literally required, citing PROSSER, supra note 164, at § 10). See DOBBS, supra note
156, at 64.
207 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 65.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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injury is concerned, assault may provide the opportunity for racial
recompense.2 1° Specifically, "the foreseeability, or risk rule, holds the
defendant subject to liability if he could reasonably foresee the nature
of the harm done, even if the total amount of harm turned out to be
quite unforeseeably large."21' It is noteworthy that it has often been
said that intentional torts offer a greater opportunity for extended
liability. 21 2 As such, some of the impediments to recoverability
presented by the negligence laws are mitigated with assault doctrine.
For instance, in negligence law, the tortfeasor engages in risky behavior
even though he should be aware of a risk of possible injury. The
assault doctrine, while still keeping the "foreseeability" requirement for
the possibility of injury, does not require that the tortfeasor foresee the
extent of that possible risk. Therefore, while the "foreseeability"
requirement is not eliminated under that assault doctrine, it is mitigated,
applying merely to the injury itself and not the extent of such injury.
Therefore a tortfeasor, who while aware of a risk decides nonetheless to
engage in risky behavior, may lack the high level mental requirement
for "intentional tortious" conduct, he or she will be liable for
negligence
Interestingly, the substantive requirements of the tort of assault
may provide for fertile consideration. Given the uncertain prospects for
successful litigation in all but the most egregious and racially abusive
situations, some scholars have called for the creation of novel theories
to seek racial recompense. For instance, Professor Richard Delgado has
called for a tort for racial insult.213 While compelling, exploration and
excavation of traditional and seemingly archaic legal doctrine may also
prove a fruitful exercise in the unearthing of valuable doctrines for
racial recompense and may provide alternative grounds for legal
pleadings.
PART III: CONSIDERING THE THIN-SKULL PLAINTIFF
AND THE EGG-SHELL PERSONALITY DOCTRINES
The Thin Skull or Eggshell rule extends tortious liability to situations
where the tortfeasor, although foreseeing certain harm, does not foresee
the amount or extent of the harm.
210 See generally id at § 43.
2' Id. at 464 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435).
212 id.
213 See generally Delgado, supra note 166.
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The label derives from an imagined case in which the
plaintiff has an unusually thin rule. The defendant, having
no reason to know of the plaintiffs peculiar susceptibility,
negligently injures the plaintiffs head. The blow would be
uncomfortable to normal people, but to the plaintiff it
causes a fractured skull and serious injury. It seems to be
agreed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all the
harm done, even though a fractured skull was definitely not
foreseeable.214
The tortfeasor must, accordingly, take the victim as she is found.215
In an ironic use of this doctrine, Marta Sanchez, a University of
Virginia law student, sued her professor, Kenneth Abraham, alleging
assault and battery.21 6 The irony stems from the fact that the lawsuit
arose from an incident in an introductory class Prof Abraham taught to
first-year law students. 2 17 "As a demonstration of a legal principle
known as the "egg-shell skull rule," Abraham touched Sanchez on the
shoulder. Sanchez said the touch--which Abraham has said was a "tap"
and Sanchez has described as a "caress"--caused her to experience
disturbing memories of rape, pregnancy and abortion that she suffered
in her native Panama." 218 Using the quintessential logic of the doctrine,
Sanchez's lawyer remarked that "[s]he brought a lot of baggage with
her., 2 19 "She had been terrorized and victimized as a child, and
although we don't hold [Prof] Abraham responsible for what happened
to her as a child, what he did is exacerbate and bring to the surface once
again her vulnerability to men with authority and power."220 Such an
unexpected and exacerbated reaction is an example of how far the Egg-
shell doctrine can be extended. Once it is determined that a foreseeable
and wrongful act has occurred, the tortfeasor is held responsible for the
214 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 464.
215 Id.
216 Opinion Journal from the Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, Let's Sue all the
Lawyers, http://www.opinionjoumal.com/best/?id=105001836 (last visited Jan. 12,
2006).
217 Id.
218 id.
219 id.
220 id.
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full extent of the harm, despite the fact that the damage is greater than
would normally be expected or experienced.22'
A caveat is in order with respect to the parameters of the Thin-
skull rule. It is important to recognize that the rule does not impose
liability for the pre-existing condition itself. "The defendant's
negligence today is not a cause in fact of a condition the plaintiff had
yesterday., 222 Instead, the Thin-skull rule imposes liability for the
unforeseeable aggravation of foreseeable harm - it is applicable to
extend liability to cover the scope of the harm, despite the fact such
scope was unforeseeable. 223 Second, the thin-skull doctrine does not
require that a defendant apply any special care for a plaintiffs
unforeseeable vulnerability, since the rule applies not to the negligence
224issue but only to the issue of proximate cause. Essentially, this
means that the thin-skull doctrine is applicable only when the
defendant's conduct was outside the realm of ordinary care thereby
placing normal people at risk.225
By having to "take the victim as one finds him"226 the tortfeasor
is forced to bear the results of any disparate and unexpected injury
borne by the victim. So, in the hypothetical case of a cross burning on
the private property of a victim who suffers a stroke or a heart attack
upon the sight of the burning symbols, the tortfeasors must bear the
burden of compensating the plaintiff for any exacerbated damages
221 Opinion Journal from the Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, Let's Sue all the
Lawyers, http://www.opinionjournal.com/best/?id=105001836 (last visited Jan. 12,
2006).
222 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 465.
223 If the defendant knows or should know of the plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility, he
is of course obliged to exercise ordinary care with that susceptibility in mind and is
liable for injuries caused if he does not. But that liability does not invoke the thin
skull rule, which deals with injuries of an unforeseeable extent.) Once the defendant
does that, the thin skull rule provides that he is liable for all the personal injuries
actually caused, although they may be greater than those that would be suffered by a
normal person. Vaughn v. Nissan Motor Corporation, 77 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir.
1996) ("The tortfeasor's duty of care is measured by the ordinary person, but the
plaintiff's injuries may not be. In short, if defendant breached its objective duty of
care, it must take its victim as it finds her.").
224 Vaughn, 77 F.3d at 738.
225 Id.
226 Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (Wisc. 1891) (espousing the 'thin
skull' rule). Williams, supra note 5, at 338 ("In the realm of the physical, racism
creates corresponding vulnerability as societal institutions disparately distribute the
quality and quantity of health-enhancing benefits to racialized persons. Such profound
impacts of racism at the level of the social institution shape the socio-economic
opportunities, mobility and indeed the life chances for racialized communities.").
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flowing from the trespass generated by a legacy of racialized abuse.
Indeed, catalysts for exacerbation of metal trauma need not even be
prima facie oppressive or racialized for an underlying mental
vulnerability to be awakened from dormancy - even non-identity
driven torts will suffice to ground the doctrine.
The tort law doctrines examining thin-skulled plaintiffs and
egg-shell personalities as potentially responsive conceptual frameworks
might be instructive points of departure for such an exploration.
2 27
Taking the "thin-skull" problem first, it has been held that the
reasonable foreseeability test instructs that a tortfeasor 'takes his victim
as he finds him.' 228 The general policy rational for allowing recovery
for such unanticipated aggravated injuries is that judges believe it
would be unjust to deny such compensation. 2 9  Specifically, such
aggravated injury can be seen as falling within the foresight doctrine as
it is foreseeable that anything can happen to a fragile person who is hurt
in an accident.230 Others, such as Madam Justice Wilson,231 have found
separate support for the doctrine apart from the foreseeability test.
The concept that the wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds
him has little to do with foreseeability. It has a great deal to
do with who, as a policy matter, should bear the loss when
for reasons of peculiar vulnerability the victim of the
defendant's negligence suffers greater injury or a different
type of injury then the average victim would have suffered.
It premises, as it were, a norm of vulnerability of the
average person and makes the wrongdoer rather than the
victim bear the damage suffered by those falling short of
232the norm.
227 Negligence law supposes a duty of care, which is breached, either willfully,
recklessly, carelessly or negligently. The duty of care implies a standard of care. This
duty and, corresponding standard, must be foreseeable in order for the plaintiff to be
compensated. The injury must not be too remote and an intervening action cannot
have occurred which absolves the initial tortfeasor or responsibility.
228 Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., (1961) 3 All E.R. 1159, 1161 (Q.B.).22 9 See id at 1161-62.
230 See Negretto v. Sayers (1963) S.A.S.R. 313.
231 Justice Wilson was the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
232 Cotic v. Gray, [1981] 17 C.C. L.T. 138, 178, aft'd, [1984] 26 C.C.L.T. 163.
Justice Wilson's interpretation of the thin-skull doctrine is akin to the doctrine of
assumption of risk but in favor of the plaintiff. Assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense for which the defendant bears the burden of proving. Donald H. Henderson
et al., The Use of Exculpatory Clauses and Consent Forms by Educational
Institutions, 67 ED. LAW REP. 13, 36 (1991). To succeed, the defendant generally
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As a matter of policy, therefore, the wrongdoer should bear the
costs, whether or not the thin-skull consequences are foreseeable. It
may well be that, due to the difficulty of distinguishing between
injuries that are foreseeable and those which are not, efficient
administration of the tort law system requires that the plaintiff be
reimbursed for all physical and mental consequences of the injury.233
Thus the logic may be tied to the notion of corrective justice, as the
costs must be borne by one of the two parties. Some scholars believe
the thin-skull rule is expressly moral as it holds that the innocent
plaintiff, however vulnerable or peculiar, should not bear the costs of
the accident.
234
Another example of the application of the thin-skull doctrine is
found in Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd.235 In Smith, spattering
molten metal burned a workman's lip. The burn triggered the
development of cancer at a place where the plaintiff had pre-malignant
cancerous tissues. The workman died from this cancer three years later
and his wife sued his employer. Lord Chief Justice Parker chose to
preserve the Thin-skull plaintiff rule2 36 and stated that,
The test is not whether these [defendants] could reasonably
have foreseen that a bum would cause cancer and that he
would die. The question is whether these employers could
reasonably foresee the type of injury he suffered, namely
must prove the plaintiff: "(1) knew of the risk; (2) had full subjective understanding
of its nature; (3) voluntarily chose to encounter that risk; and (4) agreed in advance
not to hold the defendant liable for the consequences of conduct that would ordinarily
amount to negligence." Id. at 17. A majority of jurisdictions allow express assumption
of the risk to serve as a complete bar to recovery by the plaintiff. Id. However, in
some jurisdictions the application of the defense has been limited or completely
abolished. Id.
233 See Patricia Pattison & Philip E. Varca, Workers' Compensation for Mental Stress
Claims in Wyoming, 29 LAND & WATER L. REv. 145,151 (1994) (stating that the
eggshell or thin-skull doctrine applies to both physical and mental claims regardless
of the preexisting makeup of claimant).
234 See Dennis Klimchuk, Causation, Thin Skulls and Equality, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIs.
115 (1998).
235 Leech Brain & Co, (1961) 3 All E.R. at 1159.
236 Id. This ruling was made despite the intervening decision of the court in Wagon
Mound (No. 1). Overseas Tankship, Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co.,, (1961) 1 All
E.R. 404 (always called The Wagon Mound case). Following Wagon Mound, there
was cause for concern that the thin-skull rule would be abandoned on the ground that
unusual susceptibility is not reasonably foreseeable. See ALLEN M. LINDEN,
CANADIAN TORT LAW 325 (7th ed. 2001).
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the burn. What, in this particular case, is the amount of
damage which he suffers as a result of that burn depends on
the characteristics and constitution of the victim.
237
It has been accepted, since the turn of the century, that a
negligent defendant must take his victim as he finds him. A plaintiff
with a thin skull sustains a different degree of harm -- not a different
kind of harm -- than a plaintiff with a "thick skull," because no set of
precautions exists that would reduce the one harm significantly and
efficiently without reducing the other harm.238 It has been stated 23 9 that
Lord Justice Kennedy in Dulieu v. White and Sons240 enunciated this
rule. This case considered the issues of nervous shock occasioned by
fright and remoteness of damages. Dulieu involved a pregnant plaintiff
who was involved in an accident where the defendant driver of a "pair-
horse van" negligently drove into the public house where she was
working. As a consequence the plaintiff sustained a severe shock,
became seriously ill and prematurely delivered the baby. The reported
decision states that, "[i]n consequence of the shock sustained by the
plaintiff the said child was born an idiot."241 The defendants argued that
the damages sought to be recovered were too remote as he did not
anticipate plaintiffs pregnant condition. In order to be successful, the
plaintiff had to establish, "a natural and continuous sequence
uninterruptedly connecting the breach of duty with the damage as cause
and effect. 242 The court stated:
If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently
injured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer's claim
for damage that he would have suffered less injury, or no
injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an
unusually weak heart."
243
The reasonable foreseeability test requires only that there be
foreseeability of the type of injury and not its extent or the manner of
its occurrence.
237 Smith, (1961) 3 All E.R. at 1162.
238 See generally Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69
IOWA L. REv. 363 (1984).
239 LINDEN, supra note 236, at 324.
240 Dilieu v. White & Sons, (1901) 2 K.B. 669, 679.
241 Id. at 670.
242 Id. at 671.
243 Id. at 679.
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The test is not whether these defendants could reasonably
have foreseen that a burn would cause cancer and that Mr.
Smith would die. The question is whether these defendants
could reasonably foresee the type of injury he suffered,
namely, the bum. What, in the particular case, is the
amount of damage which he suffers as a result of that bum
depends on the characteristics and constitution of the
victim.
244
Thus, if the principles of the Thin-skull doctrine were applied
where injury is inflicted to a racialized person, failures of proof that so
often prevent recompense when intentional torts or civil rights
arguments are presented, would pose less of a burden to overcome. For
example, in the scenario of an injury inflicted by a white tortfeasor
upon a racialized person, who is particularly vulnerable due to the
ravages of racism, the fact that the effect of the tort is more serious than
one would have expected ought to be of no particular consequence in
the formulation of an appropriate remedy. The person's particular
racism-induced vulnerability would in essence be that person's
quintessential "thin-skull." The tortfeasor would be held liable for the
full extent of the plaintiffs injuries, notwithstanding that they were
more serious due to a pre-existing condition, or the increased
vulnerability of the plaintiff, as long as the initial injuries were of a
kind that was reasonably foreseeable.
One who is guilty of negligence to another must put up
with idiosyncrasies of his victim that increase the
likelihood or extent of damage to him - it is no answer to
a claim for a fractured skull that its owner had an unusually
fragile one.245
Thus, there may be possibilities for compensating racialized
defendants, who are "thin skulled" due to racism, for the tortuous
wrongdoings they have suffered. Utilization of this doctrine together
with Egg shell personality and assumption of risk principles may prove
useful tools in more accurately defining and shaping the proper remedy
for racialized persons who are particularly vulnerable or susceptible to
injuries due to micro and macro racial aggression.
244 Smith, (1961) 3 All E.R. at 1162.
245 Owens v. Liverpool, (1939) 1 K.B. 394, 400. (A.C.).
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The principle is applicable to other pre-existing susceptibilities
as well. 246 Indeed a defendant is liable for the full amount of the
damages incurred by someone with a weak or "rotten" disc, if his
negligence "aggravates or brings into activity a dormant or diseased
condition or one to which a person is predisposed., 247 Some cases
speak of the pre-existing condition more generally as a "condition" -
this should leave room for the examination of pre-existing mental
conditions as pre-cursors to the thin-skull rule. For instance, in the
Australian case of Watts v. Rake2 48 the plaintiffs leg was broken in an
accident. The quiescent spondylitis from which he suffered developed
into arthritis 13 years earlier than it ordinarily would have in the
absence of the accident. The Australian High Court ruled that, "...if
the injury proves more serious in its incidents and its consequences
because of the injured man's condition, that does nothing but increase
the damages the defendant must pay." 249 This analysis involves close
examination of the circumstances of the case, including the peculiar
susceptibility of the plaintiff.
250
The extent to which the Thin skull doctrine has been stretched
is evidenced by the case of Warren v. Scruttons Ltd.251 The plaintiff had
a pre-existing ulcer on his left eye when he cut his finger on a wire on
the defendant's equipment. The wire apparently had a type of chemical
on it, described as "poison," which led the plaintiff to contract a fever
and a virus. This resulted in further ulceration of the eye. The defendant
was found liable and the court held that, "any consequence which
results because the particular individual has some peculiarity is a
consequence for which the tortfeasor is liable."
252
In terms of equality arguments 253 women have been
246 See Wilkinson v. Lee, 617 N.W.2d 305, 390, 397-98 (Mich. 2000) (permitting
preexisting condition recovery where plaintiff's doctor testified that the accident
precipitated or accelerated the symptoms of plaintiff's tumor); Land and Lakes Co. v.
Industrial Com'n 359 Ill.App.3d 582, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding that "even
though an employee has a preexisting condition that makes him or her more
vulnerable to injury, recovery will not be denied when employee can show that a
work-related injury aggravated or accelerated the preexisting [condition]...").
247 Owen v. Dix, 196 S.W. 2d 913, 915 (Ark. 1946).
248 Watts v. Rake, (1960) 108 C.L.R. 158 (Austl.).
249 Id. at 160.
250 See id.; LINDEN, supra note 236, at 327.
251 Warren v. Scruttons Ltd., (1962) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 497 (Q.B.D.).
252 Id. at 502.
253 See Klimchuk, supra note 234, at 115 (advocating for the entrenchment of tort-like
Thin skull principles in criminal law). Where, for instance, a victim is stabbed, looses
a significant amount of blood, denies a blood transfusion on religious grounds and
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compensated for injuries specific to our sex. For instance, the Thin-
skull doctrine has been applied to compensate pregnant women who
have suffered miscarriages or who have had stillborn children.254
Similarly, where a woman whose ovaries were weakened by a previous
operation suffered injury as a result of a sudden stoppage of a train, the
court granted recovery on the basis that "the weak will suffer more than
the strong., 255 If sex does not present a bar to recovery based upon
particular vulnerabilities, why should race? Race-related, or racism-
related mental disorders, might similarly be infused into the Thin-skull
doctrine as it has generally allowed for recovery based upon such
mental vulnerabilities. Alternatively, this might more properly justify
consideration of the Eggshell personality doctrine. If a physical injury
triggers mental suffering or nervous disorders, the defendant must pay
the resultant damages, even if they are more serious than might be
expected. 256 If, however, there is a pre-existing mental condition
rendering the plaintiff particularly vulnerable, courts may still allow
recovery, thus transforming the thin-skull plaintiff into a plaintiff with
an eggshell personality.
C. Utilization of the Egg-Shell Rule
The case of Vargas v. John Labatt Ltd. is instructive. The plaintiff
became ill upon drinking a bottle of beer which contained chlorine.
Damages were awarded for mental suffering incurred as a result of a
pre-existing hysteria condition. The court found that:
If you injure a person who suffers from hysteria, you must
take him as you find him, and if the injury is out of all
proportion to the event, if it is genuine, then the one who
dies, Klimchuk states that the thin-skull rule should allow for the finding of proximate
cause - to do otherwise would violate principles of equality. The defendant should be
found culpable for the death of the victim.
254 Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction, 104 Va. 417 (1927); Schafer v.
Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897 (1992).
255 Linklater v. Minister for Railways, [1900] 18 N.Z.L.R. 526, 540.
256 LINDEN, supra note 236, at 330. Linden points out that in a case involving the
claim for mental suffering by a plaintiff as a result of being thrown against a seat of a
streetcar when it collided with a train, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that
the "nervous system is as much a part of a man's physical being as muscular or other
parts." Toronto Railway Co. v. Toms, 44 S.C.R. 268, 276 (1911).
1 Vargas v. John Labatt Ltd., [1956] O.R. 1007.
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suffers is entitled to damages.258
A young girl with latent schizophrenic tendencies was left with
a scar following an accident in the case of Enge v. Trerise.259 As a
consequence of the accident and the resultant scar, she became
schizoid, withdrawn, depressed, delusional and pre-occupied with the
scar. Despite the dissenting judges concern for such "irrational",
"morbid", "unreasonable" and indirect damages, the majority indicated
that such mental repercussions were compensable.
Similarly, in Malcolm v. Broadhurst,260 a married couple who
was injured in a car accident both suffered mental and nervous
sequelae. Due to the wife's vulnerable personality, she experienced
additional nervous symptoms because of her husbands changed
behavior. In awarding compensation for all injuries, the court stated:
... there is no difference in principle between an eggshell
skull [commonly known as thin-skull] and an egg-shell
personality... Exacerbation of her nervous depression was a
readily foreseeable consequence of injuring her... Once
damage of a particular kind, in this case psychological, can
be foreseen,...the fact that it arises in or is continued by
reason of an unusual complex of events does not avail the
defendant.. 261
As long as there is a direct link between the cause of the injury
and the damages actually sustained, there exists ample jurisprudential
support for the position that pre-existing mental disorders or
vulnerabilities are equally appropriate for consideration within the
confines of the Thin-skull or Eggshell doctrines.262 An interesting
258 Id. at 1022. See also Love v. Port of London Authority, [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 541
(where compensation was granted to a plaintiff with a "vulnerable personality" that
flared up into an "hysterical neurosis"); Beiscak v. National Coal Board, [1965] 1 All.
E.R. 895
259 Enge v. Trerise, [1960], 26 D.L.R. (2d) 529.
260 Malcolm v. Broadhurst, (1970) 3 All E.R. 508.
261 Id. at 511.
262 See Negretto, (1963) S.A.S.R. at 317 (where a woman whose pelvis was fractured
suffered post-concussional psychosis as a result of a "pre-existing tendency to mental
disorder"). The court held, that the Thin-skull rule was applicable as foresight
demands that one foresee any consequences "between negligible abrasion and
permanent incapacity or death." Id. Similarly, in Leonard v. B.C. Hydro, (1965), 50
W.W.R. 546, after falling on a bus and injuring her buttocks, the plaintiff suffered a
psychotic condition. While ultimately denying recovery on the basis that the plaintiff
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extrapolation explores possible links between race, racism and mental
illness. Hence, even if mental illness, generally, were recognized and
societally accorded as much significance as physical ailments, 263 the
causal connection of the effects of racism, as producing mental health
sequelae, may push the envelope even further.
D. The Questionable Utility of A Race-Based Thin-Skull
Doctrine
Finally, consideration must be made of the utility of even considering
race within the confines of the Thin-skull doctrine. While ethical utility
is one thing, monetary value is another. Specifically, in assessing the
amount that is to be paid to a thin-skull plaintiff as compensation for
her loss, "the value of the "thin-skull" is less than that of a normal
was feigning pain, the judge remarked in obiter dictum that the defendants must
accept the risk of a "frail skull or a weak heart..." as well as the risk of "aggravating
the condition of a psychotic." Id. at 553. See Holian v. United Grain Growers,
[1980] 11 C.C.L.T. 184 (where the court held that the plaintiffs chronic depression,
resulting from exposure to a poisonous chemical substance, was reasonably
foreseeable and within the thin-skull principle, despite the fact that it was due to his
"particular susceptibility to emotional injury."); Duwyn v. Kapielian, [1978] 7
C.C.L.T. 121.
263 Panel Set to Hear Coverage Complaints,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200201/02_stawickiebcbsappeals
(Sept. 28, 2004); Blue Cross Blue Shield Agrees to Cover Mental Health Costs,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/ features/200106/19_stawickiebluecross (last
visited Sept. 28, 2004).
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota... [has] agreed to allow a
third-party panel to review certain mental health claims as part of a
settlement resolving the state's allegations that the health plan had
illegally denied mental health coverage to children and young adults
(Minnesota v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota,, Minn. Dist.
Ct. , No. CTOO-014012 , 6/19/01). The settlement also requires the
health plan to pay the state $8.2 million. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota (BCBSM) must also try to resolve policyholders' claims
that they were unfairly denied coverage. A spokesman for the attorney
general's office said he could make no estimate on how much the
claims would cost BCBSM. A BCBSM news release said the
settlement would make its mental health and chemical dependency
services more accessible. The press release said the lawsuit pushed the
insurer to move more quickly in refining its system of care for those
with mental health disorders.
BSBC of Minnesota Agrees to Allow Panel to Review Mental Health Treatment
Claims, 10 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1016 (2001).
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skull. ' 26 4 Thus, although the tortfeasor must pay for the consequences
of the injury of a particularly vulnerable plaintiff, it has been held that
the actual cost of doing so is less than it would be for injuring a person
who was not vulnerable in the same way.265 This may, however, be too
narrow an approach to the doctrine as the Thin-skull rule can also be
understood as a bar to certain defenses. Indeed, to say that one must
take one's victim as he or she is found implies that it will not be a
defense to say that one's victim suffered greater injury than an average
or "normal" person.266 Thus the tortfeasor will have to absorb some of
the costs of the injuries, however unforeseeable, and the plaintiff might
be able to defend against any duty to mitigate damages. An example
provided by one scholar states that "if I refuse medical treatment for
reasons which under the thin-skull rule must be taken as found in me,
the defendant must bear all the costs of my injury, even those which an
average person would have taken steps to prevent." 2
67
PART IV: CONCLUSION - PARADOXICAL USE OF THE
MASTER'S TOOLS
Even as we look upon each other like strangers from afar,
we are trapped in each other's imaginations. We cannot
escape from our intimate histories, our unacknowledged
racial mixtures, our awkward and unsatisfying efforts at
integration. We have not completely purged the prejudices
from our inner thoughts: We do not discount the body's
appearance, the voice's sound, the suspicions of the mind's
inadequacy. We do not refrain from moral judgments; at
the very least, we make them secretly inside our heads. We
fear violence from the other, and no reasoned
understanding entirely extinguishes our apprehension. We
do not share power easily - not whites, who have almost all
of it, and not blacks, when they get a piece.268
270 LINDEN, supra note 236, at 329.
265 See, e.g., Warren, (1962) 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 497 (where the court considered fact
that the injured eye was inferior and was subject to other injuries in assessing
damages).
266 Klimchuk, supra note 234 at 15.
267 id.
268 DAVID K. SHIPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS 561-62 (1997).
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The provisional answer to the question of the value of this
enterprise is paradoxical. Surely, much of what had been stated above
calls for an investment in victimhood. This status is unappealing as the
very plea for recognition of (mental) vulnerability and demands for
compensation further entrenches the power of the powerful. In a way,
people or color must bleed for the court by articulating injury
(re)cognizable within the legal power structures. "Thus rights for the
systematically subordinated tend to rewrite injuries, inequalities, and
impediments to freedom that are consequent to social stratification as
matters of individual violations and rarely articulate or address the
conditions producing or fomenting that violation., 269 However, such
paradox is not an impossible political condition for racialized claimants
seeking compensation within the current legal system. It is, however,
an obviously demanding and frequently unsatisfying one. 7°
Additionally, this pragmatic enterprise operates within the existing
structures of the law and utilizes existing legal doctrine in an attempt to
translate an outsider position to an insider. As a counterpoint, the
absence of creative deployment of traditional legal doctrine leaves the
doctrine un-problematized and inaccessible - in either event the
conditions for which remedy is sought remain intact.
This articulation of creative use of traditional doctrine for
equality-seeking ends resonates with Wendy Brown's cogent
articulation of the gendered terms of liberation as a paradoxical
requirement that women's struggles engage masculinist discourse.
Women both require access to the existence of this fictional
subject and are systematically excluded from it by the
gendered terms of liberation, thereby making our
deployment of rights paradoxical. ... Rights function to
articulate a need, a condition of lack or injury, that cannot
be fully redressed or transformed by rights, yet within
existing political discourse can be signified in no other271
way.
This incitement to a radical re-examination of first principle legal
doctrine is paradoxically simultaneously constrained by a formulation
which essentially seeks to dismantle the master's house with his own
269 WENDY BROWN, Suffering the Paradox of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT
CRITIQUE 432 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
270 See id. at 430-432.
271 Id. at 431.
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tools - the existing discourse.272 Such an enterprise is reminiscent of
Audre Lorde's warnings that the master's tools will never dismantle the
master's house.273
Dismantling of the structure itself is not part of the agenda of
this analysis, not that such a re-conceptualization of the legal order is
unnecessary for the pursuit of justice. Indeed, a radical dismantling and
rebuilding is in order. It is, however, beyond the scope of this discrete
endeavor which is aimed at justifying immediate compensation for
those frequently victimized by racialized abuses and violence, and
those who might not have resources or abundant coping skills, for
instance the young McIntosh girl.
The pragmatic demands of those suffering under the burdens of
cumulative racism demand immediate attention. However, an
unintended and undesirable result of the analysis found in this article
might be a chilling of inter-racial interactions and communications.
Such a chilling-effect is, of course, undesirable. In fact, healthy inter-
racial interactions are in need of greater and more honest
communications, not fewer reserved encounters. Equality-friendly
contact along all axis of identity is preferable to paranoid exchanges
based in fear of litigation. It is already the case that the fallout of
ongoing and historical racism poisons Black-White communications
and interactions in America. Not surprisingly, researchers have
observed that Blacks and Whites in America often do not communicate
well with one another. As Shipler has pointed out,
Blacks and whites do not listen well to one another. They
infer, assume, deduce, imagine, and otherwise
miscommunicate. They give each other little grace and
allow small room for benefit of the doubt. Dialogue is
exceedingly difficult. Nor do blacks and whites listen well
to themselves as they stigmatize, derogate, slur, slight, and
otherwise offend. Quite innocently, whites make
comments that trigger old stereotypes and then get
272 While it might seems that this article disagrees with the tenets of Audre Lorde's
profound work AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the
Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110 (1984), that would
be a misreading. The approach to the legal doctrine advocated in this article is not
mutually exclusive. Instead, this article contemplates a creative use of tort law
doctrine as a short-term approach for pragmatic purposes of compensation. In keeping
with Lorde's perspective, contemporaneous engagement with legal structures as a
whole is the preferable long-term strategy for the ends of social justice.
273 See LORDE, supra note 272, at 112.
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defensive when blacks take umbrage. Blacks sometimes
think their persecuted status cloaks them in permanent
absolution for the sin of racial bigotry. And so they
commit the sin without acknowledging it, infuriating whites
274
and forestalling conversation.
Racial distrust and miscommunication are unfortunate, yet
prevalent, by-products of a history marred by racial injustice.
According to Shipler, Whites and Blacks often perceive things very
differently. Power, white privilege, and feelings of guilt all play
significant roles in the relationships between Blacks and Whites,
coloring our perceptions of one another's behavior. White privilege
often "means that [W]hites can be comfortably deaf to the racial
overtones that [B]lacks hear so vividly. And from across the line,
[B]lacks can imagine racial dissonance where none is intended., 275 In
Shipler's view, individual Blacks and Whites stand somewhere along a
spectrum of assumptions about white and black behavior.
For Blacks, this spectrum ranges from those who see racism in
every adverse encounter with a White person, to those who try not to
see racism at all.276 Critical psychology speaks to this reality of hyper-
vigilance and constant-threat awareness. For Whites, the spectrum
ranges from those "self-questioners" who constantly question their own
thoughts and motivations, to those who are apathetic to racial issues, to
those who display acute discomfort in dealing with and relating to
racialized others.277
As Harlon Dalton so eloquently expresses in Racial Healing:
We are loath to confront one another around race. We are
afraid of tapping into pent-up anger, frustration,
resentment, and pain. Even when we are not aware of
harboring such feelings ourselves, we recognize that they
exist in others. Our natural tendency is to hold them in
check, in hopes that they will somehow fade away.
Unfortunately, they will not. Tangled emotions and
inexplicable behavior are the inevitable by-products of our
274 SHIPLER, supra note 268, at 447.
2 75 Id. at 448.
276 Id. at 455. In the case of those blacks in the middle of the spectrum, deciphering
white behavior can be an exhausting effort. Id.
277 Id. This discomfort can be seen "where whites get uptight, tiptoe around, walk on
eggshells, choose their words, [and] calibrate their statements." Id.
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nation's unresolved racial past. Until we deal with them,
we resemble peasant villagers who continue to build on the
slopes of an ancient but active volcano. Or more precisely,
we are like the mountain itself: oblivious to the gurgling
deep within, proud of the new life it has nurtured, and
hoping against hope that history will not repeat itself.
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These interactions are complicated by the fact that, in order to
avoid being accused of racism, Whites may use "extreme restraint" and
avoid intimacy with Blacks, which only reinforces the distance between
blacks and whites.279 Certainly, fear of litigation will increase this
distance. The relationship between Blacks and Whites on an individual
level can be strained because "[m]ost white people probably do not feel
guilty about race relations, and they certainly do not feel the guilt that
[some] black people think they should., 280 These differences tend to
alienate Blacks and Whites in America, reinforcing the differences and
leaving us as a society of "strangers" rather than one united by common
experience. 281 Accordingly,
as we attempt to live out our lives in a multi-racial society, the line
separating Blacks and Whites "also entangle[s] us."'282 The potential of
tort law doctrine for racial recompense may paradoxically lead us
further down the road to unhealthy entanglement - this time in the legal
arena.
However, tort law deserves increased and renewed
consideration given the challenges posed by other, perhaps more
obvious, avenues for redress in communities of color in America. For
instance, in the absence of a radical rearrangement of the political,
education and social systems in the US, Blacks will likely continue to
comprise the bulk of those confined to the underclass. 283 There is much
to be gained from re-visiting and re-evaluating first-principle legal
doctrine with a view to achieving racial recompense and the promotion
of legal norms of equality. Indeed, activists and advocates for social
change must not be deterred by the fact that such traditional legal tools
were not created with such equality-seeking ends in mind. Limitation
of civil and equal rights advocacy to the realm of constitutional law is
278 HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING 3 (1995).
279 Id. at 455-56.
280 Id. at 459.
281 Id. at 561-62.
282 SHIPLER, supra note 268, at 561.
283 See generally DERRICK BELL, supra note 17.
[VOL.9.2:905
2005] CONSIDERING TORTIOUS RACISM 969
an un-strategic self-limitation. Creative utilization of traditional legal
principles is a challenge worthy of consideration if potentially fruitful
for production of alternative equality-enhancing precedents.
Specifically, by re-visioning some of the tort law doctrine through the
lens of normative equality goals, the surprising result might be
alternative frameworks for pleadings driven at racial recompense.

